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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
MEMBER-STATE REGULATION OF TRADE
WITHIN A FEDERAL OR QUASI-FEDERAL
SYSTEM: PROTECTIONISM AND
BALANCING, DA CAPO
Donald H. Regan*
The topic of this Essay is not one Terry Sandalow has worked
on, but he got me started on it by organizing, with Eric Stein,

the Bellagio Conference on comparative constitutional economic integration in the United States and the European
Community. For that, and for thirty-three years during which
he has been an unfailingly stimulating and supportive colleague, Dean, and friend, I am deeply grateful.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In many federal or quasi-federal systems, the member-states retain
significant powers of commercial regulation. The exercise of such
powers can threaten the efficiency of trade between member-states. In
pursuit of efficiency, the system will normally impose systemic limitations on the member-states' regulatory powers. By "systemic" limitations, I mean limitations that are embedded in the basic principles of
the system, that are enforceable by courts or other dispute-settlement
organs [hereafter simply "courts"], and that do not depend on specific
pronouncements of the central legislative organs, if there are any. All
of this is true of the United States, Australia, the European Union,
and the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example.
The most obvious systemic limitation, found in all the systems just
named, is a prohibition on protectionism directed by one memberstate against others. There is controversy, of course, about just how we
should understand "protectionism." Is it primarily a matter of legislative purpose? What about discriminatory effect? Does nonprotection* William W. Bishop, Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy,
University of Michigan. B.A. 1963, Harvard; LL.B. 1966, University of Virginia; B.Phil.
(Economics) 1968, Oxford; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1980, University of Michigan. - Ed. For
helpful comments, I am grateful to Omri Ben-Shahar, Daniel Halberstam, Rob Howse, Bob
Hudec, Daryl Levinson, Terry Sandalow, Joel Trachtman, and participants in a Law and
Economics Workshop at the University of Virginia Law School. Given some of the reactions, it is more than ordinarily necessary to say that errors are my own.
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ism require the use of least trade-restrictive measures? And so on. But
those issues I shall set aside for now.
Another issue, no less controversial than the meaning of protectionism, is whether there should be any other systemic limitations on
member-state trade regulation, over and above the prohibition on protectionism. One popular candidate for an additional sort of review is
what I shall refer to as "balancing," though I mean to include also true
"proportionality" review. The feature that defines "balancing" as I use
the term is that it requires the court to identify and compare the local
benefits and foreign burdens that result from the regulation under review.' The standard theoretical argument for balancing goes as follows: Member-state laws, even if they are not protectionist, may be
costly to foreigners (that is, to residents of other member-states). But
those foreigners are not represented in the member-state legislature
that adopted the law. Their interests are therefore not taken into account when the law is adopted, and the cost of the law to the foreigners may well be greater than the benefit to locals. In order to avoid
that sort of cost-benefit failure or Kaldor-Hicks inefficiency, we need
to have a court compare the local benefits and the foreign costs of the
law, and invalidate laws, even nonprotectionist laws, if the foreign
costs are greater than the local benefits (balancing) or if they are too
much greater (proportionality review).2
I shall call this the "virtual representation" argument for balancing.
On its face, it seems quite persuasive. The idea that when a social decision is made, all affected interests should somehow be taken into account is powerful and appealing, and it seems to require that when a
legislative decision is made, interests that are not represented in the
legislature should be given virtual representation by the courts. To be
sure, we may well doubt courts' competence to identify benefits and
costs in practice, and we may doubt the propriety of courts' deciding
the evaluative issues that must be faced before, say, a local benefit to
the environment can be weighed against a foreign loss of jobs. But to
many people the theoretical case for judicial intervention seems so
strong that they think we should suppress our doubts about judicial

1. Hence neither pure "rationality review" nor pure "less restrictive alternative analysis" is a form of balancing as I use the term. Both these modes of review focus on whether
there are any benefits, either from the regulation in itself, or from the regulation as opposed
to some alternative. Neither requires the comparison of benefits and burdens. I shall discuss
the role of such versions of means-ends scrutiny in Section II.B.3 and Part III, and I shall
discuss the relation between the pure and impure forms of these tests in Appendix 2.
2. E.g., MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE, THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE & THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998) (there is a great deal else in
Maduro's very interesting and useful book, which I like much better than this particular argument); Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity,
9 EUR, J. INT'L L. 32 (1998); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979
WIS. L. REV. 125.
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fitness for the task and simply instruct courts to wade in and do the
best they can.
There is a flaw in the argument, however - a flaw in the theoretical argument that judicial supervision is needed, over and above protectionism review. Although the virtual representation argument has
force in some contexts, we shall see that it has no force in the most
common types of trade regulation case. I am tempted to say it has no
force in any trade regulation case. But since "trade regulation" is not a
term of art, and some later examples will reveal that the boundaries of
the term are unclear, I content myself with the less dramatic claim
about the "most common types" of trade regulation case. As I shall
explain, so long as the regulation under review is nonprotectionist, the
foreign interests in (most or all) trade regulation cases, even though
they are not represented in the regulating state's legislature, are nonetheless fully and efficiently accounted for by another mechanism essentially the same mechanism by which a failure-free unregulated
market integrates consumer and producer interests and generates efficient outcomes. Since the foreign interests are fully accounted for,
there is no need for judicial "virtual representation" in these cases.
Judicial intervention in the form of balancing review is at best unnecessary and at worst counterproductive.'
Of course, eliminating the virtual representation argument does
not by itself tell us what the rules for reviewing member-state trade
regulation should be in any particular system. Each system has its own
goals, and the judicial organs of the various systems must interpret different foundational texts in different institutional settings. Still, the
foundational texts in all the systems named above leave a good deal to
interpretation, and interpretation should be informed by sound
theory. I am confident that many interpretive questions would look
different if it were understood that balancing review is not necessary
to protect out-of-state interests affected by the commonest sorts of
nonprotectionist trade regulation.
Spelling out the limits on the virtual representation argument is the
project for Part II. In Part III, I offer some related new thoughts on
the meaning and identification of protectionism. The considerations
canvassed in Part II help us to see why we should understand protectionism in terms of discriminatory purpose. A variety of other factors

3. My present claim goes a step beyond my 1986 article, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091. In
that article I in effect conceded that the virtual representation argument did make a positive
case for judicial balancing in trade regulation cases. I argued that there was a stronger case
against balancing, based primarily on doubts about judicial competence and the value of
state autonomy, but I did concede the virtual representation argument some force. My present view is that I conceded too much. The virtual representation argument has no force at all
in this context. (Strangely, all the materials for my present understanding were there in 1986,
dispersed through that article. Why I couldn't bring them together I do not know.)
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that are sometimes thought to be the essence of protectionism are
relevant as evidence on the issue of discriminatory purpose - the use
of an explicit domestic/foreign classification,4 the presence of a disparate impact on foreign competitors, the use of means that are not least
trade-restrictive, and so on - but in the end what matters is discriminatory purpose.
Talking about the purpose of a corporate body like a legislature is
to some degree metaphorical, and it makes many people uncomfortable. I shall explain in Section III.B how we can cash out the metaphor
of legislative "purpose" in terms of other aspects of the legislative process. And doing so provides insight into a number of standard questions about purpose analysis: whether our concern should be with
"subjective" or "objective" intent; how to deal with the fact that many
individual legislators may have only "oblique" purposes like doing a
favor for a political friend; what to make of cases where there are multiple purposes; and so on. I also explain in Section III.C why the inquiry into legislative purpose does not dissolve in hard cases into balancing, as is often claimed. Finally, there are two Appendices, one on
"unconscious" discriminatory purpose and another on the logical relations between various forms of rationality review, less restrictive alternative analysis, and cost-benefit balancing or proportionality review.6
A comment added at the last minute: I may have written this Essay
too much as if efficiency were the unique goal of every economic union. I do not believe that, and I hope the reader will not be distracted
from my arguments by disagreement with a proposition I did not mean
to suggest. The virtual representation argument is about efficiency. It
says that in trade-regulation cases, judicial cost-benefit analysis to pro-

4. This may be such strong evidence that it triggers a formal presumption of illegality,
like the United States Supreme Court's "virtually per se" rule. Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Similarly, if we leave aside the possibility of explicitly distinct
treatment of foreign goods that is still not less favorable, explicit discrimination will violate
Article III or Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) (subject
to justification under Article XX), or Article 30 or 34 of the Treaty of Rome (subject to justification under Article 36).
5. I intentionally do not use the phrase "de facto discrimination." "Disparate impact"
has the virtue of referring to differential effect on locals and foreigners, while remaining
neutral on the issue of whether that differential effect amounts to a violation. In contrast,
"de facto discrimination" tends to be nonneutral on that issue, and nonneutral in different
ways for the trade law community (for whom "de facto discrimination" seems to connote the
presence of a violation) and the American constitutional law community (for whom "de

facto discrimination," or its more often encountered analogue "de facto segregation," connotes precisely the absence of a violation).

6. The central argument. of Part II, explaining the limits of the virtual representation
argument in the trade regulation context, does not depend on any specific understanding of
protectionism or balancing. If I occasionally refer to protectionism and balancing in Part II, I
shall be assuming only the roughest understanding of them, for heuristic purposes only (ex-

cept in Section II.B.3, where I will anticipate some of the arguments of Part III).
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tect foreign interests will promote efficiency. I explain why that is not
so. Similarly, the most common reason given for suppressing protectionism is that it is inefficient. I explain why, if that is the objection to
protectionism, protectionism should be understood in terms of legislative purpose. So, I am concerned in this Essay with the role of judicial
review in promoting efficiency, which is surely a central value. I do not
mean to suggest that efficiency is all that matters, or all that a court
should ever aim at.
II.

REFUTING THE VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION ARGUMENT

A.
Consider some simple examples:
1. Widgets are a consumer product that can be made out of cardboard or plastic. Cardboard widgets are produced in the state of
Calivada, plastic widgets in the neighboring state of Nefornia. No widget producers have significant market power. There are no known
health, safety, or environmental dangers from either cardboard or
plastic widgets. Cardboard widgets and plastic widgets are close substitutes, but some consumers prefer one and some prefer the other. Obviously, there is no case here for legislative or judicial interference
with consumer choice in either Calivada or Nefornia. If we let each
consumer buy the sort of widget he prefers, at prevailing prices, the
unregulated market will generate an efficient result. The one thing
worth noticing about this case, because it presages future claims, is
that we get an efficient result even though the consumer gives no
thought at all to the interests of producers, neither those he buys from,
nor those he does not. He reacts to prices, which contain information
about producer interests, but the connection with producer interests
need never occur to him. The only interests he considers as such are
his own.
2. Now suppose the Calivada legislature is presented with new
and convincing evidence that plastic widgets damage the Calivada environment in ways that cardboard widgets do not. The Calivada widget
consumers don't actually care about this, but other citizens of
Calivada, whom I shall call "environmentalists," do care. (Nefornia
has no environmentalists.) We now have a textbook case of an externality, imposed by Calivada's plastic widget consumers on its environmentalists. In order to internalize the externality, the Calivada
legislature investigates how much damage each plastic widget consumed in Calivada does to the interests of the Calivada environmentalists (all together). It decides that each plastic widget does damage in
the amount T dollars, and it imposes a tax of T dollars on the purchase
of each plastic widget. Since Pigou, we have believed, rightly, that if
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the legislature has set the tax so that it accurately reflects the environmental damage from plastic widgets, we will again get efficient results. Plastic widget consumers are forced by the tax to internalize the
interests of the environmentalists in their consumption decisions, and
the rest of the work of bringing consumer and producer interests into
the process is done by the same basic mechanism that generates efficient results in an unregulated market where there are no market failures. The crucial point to notice about this example is that all,the legislature needs to think about is the interests of the environmentalists. If
what we are concerned about is efficiency, there is no need for the
legislature to give any thought at all to the interests of the consumers
or of the producers.' If the interests of the environmentalists are properly reflected in the tax, we will get efficient results.'
3. Now, suppose that when the legislature investigates the damage
from plastic widgets, it concludes that the appropriate tax (the tax that
accurately reflects the damage) is so high that it would drive away not
just some marginal consumers of plastic widgets, but all or almost all
inframarginal consumers, and that this would be true at any reasonably foreseeable price, even if producers of plastic widgets could lower
their prices to some degree. In other words, the damage to the
Calivada environmentalists and the interests of Calivada widget consumers are such that a tax that forced the consumers to internalize the
damage to the environmentalists would destroy the market for plastic
widgets at any reasonably foreseeable price. In these circumstances,
the Calivada legislature might quite reasonably decide not to impose
the efficient tax, but rather to impose a flat prohibition on the sale or
use of plastic widgets in Calivada, which is administratively simpler. If,
as we have supposed, the efficient tax would destroy or essentially destroy the market for plastic widgets, then the flat ban is efficient as a
substitute.
In this scenario, the legislature does need to think about more than
the interests of the environmentalists. For one thing, it needs to think
about the interests of the Calivada plastic widget consumers; it needs
7. The point of the qualification "if what we are concerned about is efficiency" is to set
aside cases such as, for example, where we are prepared to allow inefficient consumption of
plastic widgets because plastic widgets are essential to the lives of plastic widget consumers
who tend to be poor.
8. In case the reader is wondering, "Efficient in what sense?", the answer is, efficient in
any sense we might care about. In some contexts, an arrangement might be Pareto-efficient
with respect to the set of accessible alternative arrangements, without being Kaldor-Hicks
efficient: there might be a Kaldor-Hicks superior alternative from which we cannot generate
a Pareto-superior alternative because transaction costs prevent the payment of the necessary
compensation to the losers. But with a functioning market, even subject to the green tax,
there is no possibility of getting stuck in a situation where consumers buy too few plastic
widgets (in the Kaldor-Hicks sense) but transaction costs prevent an appropriate bribe to get
them to buy more. The producers can offer the required "bribe" just by lowering the price.
This example is developed in slightly more arithmetical detail in Section II.C.2 below.
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in effect to estimate the consumer surplus being reaped by various inframarginal consumers at prevailing prices. But the interests of the
Calivada widget consumers, like the interests of the environmentalists,
are local interests, represented in the Calivada legislature. The significance of that will emerge in a moment. The legislature also needs to
think about the producers of plastic widgets, at least to the extent of
estimating the limits of "reasonably foreseeable" price reductions. We
could think of this as a purely empirical inquiry, or we could think of it
as an inquiry into how robustly the prevailing price reflects the producers' interests - but in either event it is not likely to be a terribly
demanding inquiry. The legislature will surely be justified in assuming
that it will not see drastic price reductions, and in many cases it will be
clear from consideration of the environmentalists' interests and the
consumers' interests that without drastic price reductions, the efficient
tax will destroy the market. In the remaining cases, where less-thandrastic price reductions might preserve some market share for plastic
widgets, the legislature should prefer the efficient tax to the ban. It
should put the tax in place, and let the market mechanism take its
course.
I have said that if there is doubt about whether the efficient tax
would leave some market share for plastic widgets, the legislature
should eschew a flat ban and prefer the tax. What is more, they have
an incentive to do so. It might seem that the legislature would not mind
making the mistake of imposing an inefficient ban, since the ban operates against the interests of foreign producers. But an inefficient ban
would be against the interest of some local consumers as well. It would
prevent transactions by inframarginal consumers whose preference for
plastic widgets is strong enough that they would buy them, even with
the substantial efficient tax in place, at prices the producers can manage to offer. If we assume the legislature is not motivated by protectionism, that it is merely trying to prevent inefficient damage to the
environment, it will not want to prevent these transactions, which
would be efficient and would benefit local consumers. So, if the
Calivada legislature responds correctly to all local interests, any ban it
imposes will also be globally efficient.
The crucial point that we have established regarding our three examples is this: If the legislatureadopts legislation that optimizes with respect to all the affected in-state interests, then the overall result will be
efficient with respect to all interests, local and foreign.9 I shall refer to
9. This is true even in the first example, somewhat trivially. The legislature's nonintervention is a decision, and it is a decision that could be mistaken if, for example, there is some
externality the legislature overlooks or does not respond to. But if nonintervention is right
for the local interests, it will be efficient overall.
Notice that although I have sometimes included in the text a qualification like "provided
the legislation is not protectionist," that qualification is not strictly necessary here. It is already implicit. Protectionist legislation does not optimize over local interests (except per-
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this property of our examples as "local/global equivalence." To say
that a sort of regulation exhibits "local/global equivalence" is to say
that if a regulation of that sort optimizes "locally" (over all in-state interests), it will necessarily optimize "globally" (it will lead to an outcome that is efficient with respect to all interests, local and foreign).
Now, I do not suggest that all sorts of regulation exhibit local/global
equivalence; it is easy to think of cases where regulation that is best
for local interests is not efficient overall. There is even room for dispute at the boundaries about whether all "trade regulation" cases exhibit local/global equivalence. I shall discuss a variety of examples that
will give us a better picture of the scope of the phenomenon in the
next section. But for now, I want to stick with our three examples,
which represent a wide range of trade regulation cases. I want to-focus
on the consequences of local/global equivalence, specifically the consequences for the virtual representation argument.
In a nutshell, local/global equivalence, where it exists, completely
undercuts the virtual representation argument. The proponent of the
virtual representation argument says we need judicial intervention to
protect foreign interests. But even the proponent of the virtual representation argument does not suggest that there should generally be judicial intervention to protect local interests against economic or social
legislation they do not like. Rather, because local interests are represented in the political process, we generally presume that the legislature will do better at optimizing over local interests than a court would
do, unless there is some specific reason to suspect a failure of the political process (with regard to local interests). Now the crucial point: In
regulatory contexts that exhibit local/global equivalence, presuming
that the legislature will do better than a court at optimizing over local
interests amounts to presuming that it will do better than a court at
optimizing over all interests, local and foreign, even though it does not
care directly about the foreign interests at all. And if the legislature
will do better than a court at optimizing over all interests, even though
it does not consider foreign interests, there is no need for the court to
intervene to protect foreign interests. In sum, where there is local/global equivalence, the virtual representation argument has no
purchase.
I am not claiming legislatures always succeed in getting it right for
local interests. Of course they don't. But the issue here is one of relative competence. Our general assumption, as I say, is that in the
sphere of social and economic legislation, legislatures do better than
courts at promoting local, represented interests; courts should not intervene to second-guess the legislature on behalf of local interests unhaps in special cases we ignore, see infra note 10); hence, conversely, legislation that optimizes over local interests is necessarily not protectionist. I shall have more to say about protectionism and local welfare below.
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less there is some specific reason to suspect a failure of the political
process (with regard to local interests). It follows that in cases like our
examples, where getting it right for locals entails getting it right for
everyone, the courts also should not intervene to protect foreign interests unless there is specific reason to suspect a failure of the political
process in the treatment of local interests.
Notice that what I have just said is perfectly consistent with the
idea that courts should intervene to suppress protectionism. Protectionist legislation normally does not optimize over all local interests. It
normally does result from a failure of the political process with respect
to local interests."° Protectionist legislation standardly results from local producer interests wielding excessive power in the political process, which allows them to exploit disorganized consumer interests. So,
in any case where there is a significant suggestion of protectionism, it
is appropriate for the court to consider whether the political process
has gone awry in its treatment of local interests. But if the answer is no
(if the law is not protectionist), there is no justification for balancing to
protect foreign interests.
Notice also, my claim is that the legislature does not need to weigh,
or even to think explicitly about, foreign interests. That is to say, it
does not need to try to ascertain and evaluate the effects of its regulation on foreign producers. That is not at all to say that the legislature
should or may refuse to hear evidence and argumentfrom foreign producers about the empirical questions that it does need to think about
- in the present context, questions about what effects plastic widgets
have on the local environment and, if a ban is being considered,
whether the efficient tax would destroy the market. For the legislature
to refuse to receive relevant submissions on these questions, even
from foreign producers, would strongly suggest a process failure resulting from excessive control of the legislature by local producers (in
other words, protectionism)."
The proposition that optimizing over local interests entails optimizing over all interests may seem paradoxical, even when it is limited
to our examples. One way to account for the paradoxical result is to
suggest that the interests of foreign producers receive vicarious con10. Where this is not true - where protectionism in the short run might be efficient, on
infant industry grounds, for example - it is not clear in principle that protectionism should
be suppressed. If we enforce an absolute prohibition on protectionism, that reflects a plausible choice of prophylactic rule.
11. This seems as good a time as any to insert the general point that, just as I use "court"
to include other quasi-judicial dispute-settlement organs, so I use "legislature" to include
administrative agencies in their rule-making capacity. Administrative agencies are subject to
somewhat different political forces than legislatures, but even so they have much more in
common with legislatures than courts do. And we think courts should normally defer to administrative agencies in their rule-making capacity for approximately the same reasons of
expertise and political responsiveness that call for deference to legislatures - in addition to
the fact that the legislature created the agency and retains supervisory control.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1861 2000-2001

1862

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1853

sideration through their connection with the interests of local consumers who want to buy from them. This is the right explanation, subject
to certain further conditions, but it might seem that this sort of explanation cannot be enough in any circumstances. Local consumers and
foreign producers both have interests in the transactions that might
take place between them, but these are separate interests. So it might
seem that even if the legislature weighs the local consumers' interests
in these transactions, that still leaves the weight of the foreign producers' interests out of the balance.
But "weighing" is the wrong metaphor here. If the legislature were
engaged in a command-and-control exercise, trying to figure out for
itself what should be produced, and how, and by whom, and who
should then consume it, then indeed the legislature would have to
identify and weigh for itself all the relevant interests. But that is not
what the legislature is doing. Rather than entirely displacing the market, the legislature is trying to adjust the market mechanism (or avoid
adjusting it when no adjustment is needed, as in our very first example) so that the market mechanism, as adjusted, will produce efficient
results. This is obviously what is going in the second example, with the
green tax, and it is also what is going on in effect in the third example
if we remember that the legislature will adopt a ban only if it mimics
the effect of the efficient tax. The crucial point about our examples is
that the appropriate adjustment to the market mechanism, which will
lead to globally efficient outcomes, can be identified solely on the basis of local interests.12
This leads us to a broader, very important lesson: Talk about balancing the "value of trade" against other values - whether it be substantive values like health or the environment; or institutional values
like local regulatory autonomy - is often dangerously misleading. At
least insofar as we are concerned with the short term and with static
efficiency, there is no general "value of trade." We want to promote
efficient exchanges, but we also want to prevent inefficient exchanges
(such as consumption of environmentally damaging plastic widgets by
marginal Calivada consumers). The problem in designing the trade
system is not to decide where to strike the balance between the value
of trade and other values. Rather, the problem is to structure the system so that it generates all and only efficient exchanges (or as close as
we can come to that ideal). Member-state governments have impor12. It is important that in our examples all significantly affected foreign interests are in a
market relationship (direct or indirect) with the local actors. If, for example, the consumption of plastic widgets in Calivada has negative external effects in the neighboring state of
Washegon, then the Calivada legislature's optimizing over local interests does not guarantee
global efficiency. But this does not save the virtual representation argument as it is standardly deployed in discussions of trade regulation. Virtual representation theorists argue
that we need judicial protection (over and above the protectionism inquiry) for the interests
of the foreign plastic widget producers.That is just what our examples show is not needed.
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tant contributions to make to the project of optimally structuring the
trade system, often by facilitating exchange, but sometimes by actively
preventing it, as in our second and third examples. The specific problem for the creators and interpreters of the systemic limitations on
member-state regulation is to devise rules that will allow memberstate governments to make local adjustments to the trading system
that improve the performance of the system in generating efficient results (even when that involves preventing exchange), while preventing
member-state governments from making adjustments that undermine
the efficiency of the system (some of which, export subsidies for example, may promote exchange). It is impossible to think about this
problem sensibly if one tries to cast it as balancing a putative "value of
trade" against other values.
It might be said that in any individual instance of exchange - for
example, any individual purchase by a Calivada consumer of a foreign
plastic widget - there is a clear "value of [this] trade," namely the
consumer surplus created by the purchase. And it might be said further that we do precisely want this "value of trade" to be balanced
against the harm to the environment the transaction causes. In a sense,
this is all true. But ideally the way we would like this balance to be
struck in the individual instance is by the consumer, and we can get
him to do it by imposing a green tax that just reflects the harm to the
environment. With the tax in place, no one but the consumer needs to
think about the value of the widget to the consumer. So there is still no
call for the legislature to think about the "value of trade," in the individual instance or in the aggregate. A fortiori, there is no call for a reviewing court to think about or balance such a value. Of course, if the
legislature is considering a ban, it must consider the consumer surplus
(and its distribution), but only crudely. The efficient tax should be preferred to the ban if there is any real doubt about the tax's effect on the
market. And to the extent the legislature thinks about consumer surplus, this is a standard local value of the sort the legislature is presumed to deal with better than a court, provided it is not- engaged in
protectionism. References to "the value of trade" suggest the presence
of a distinct federal systemic value that requires special judicial protection. But other than anti-protectionism, there is no such value in the
present picture.13

13. It should also be clear why there is no need to balance the "value of trade" against
the value of local regulatory autonomy. Provided the member-state is not engaged in protectionism, there is no conflict. As we have seen, member-states as regulators have an essential
role to play in fine-tuning the trading system to achieve efficiency - that is, in guaranteeing
that trade is in fact valuable. Local regulatory autonomy, absent protectionism, supports the
value of trade. For similar observations in a different context, see Robert L. Howse &
Donald H. Regan, The Product/ProcessDistinction - An Illusory Basis for Disciplining
'Unilateralism'in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 249, 285 (2000).
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Things look somewhat different if we broaden our view, so that we
consider the long term and dynamic efficiency. In that perspective,
trade may do many useful things besides promoting statically efficient
exchange. It may promote technological progress, growth, and economic development; it may spread ideas, open cultures and help to
subvert, undemocratic regimes; it may reduce the likelihood of war.
The multifariousness of these possible benefits and the uncertainty of
their connection to any particular trade-promoting measures make it
natural and sometimes even reasonable to speak of a general "value of
trade." But that same multifariousness and uncertainty raise grave
doubts about whether courts should engage in balancing with this
"value of trade" in the course of elaborating and applying the systemic
limitations on member-state regulation. The treaty-makers or
constitution-writers may balance this "value of trade" against other
values, including static efficiency, when they are formulating specific
rules on member-state regulation to be enforced by courts in specific
systems. The treaty-makers and constitution-writers plainly should
think about dynamic efficiency, and other matters such as international distribution, in some way or other. If the rules the treaty-makers
come up with require courts to look at considerations other than static
efficiency, so be it. But I am skeptical of the suggestion that courts
should consider any general "value of trade" on their own initiative,
when they are enforcing rules whose primary object is plainly the suppression of protectionism. 4 (If I am wrong about this, it does not matter to my central project, which is to clarify the role of judicial review
in promoting static efficiency. The balancing with the "value of trade"
that we are discussing in this paragraph is not the cost-benefit balancing recommended by the virtual representation argument.)
Let us return to the specific examples. If local/global equivalence
still seems paradoxical, let me offer two further suggestions to make it
less so. First, as a possibly useful metaphor, we can think of the state
of Calivada as a collective consumer, and the Calivada legislature as
making a collective consumption decision. 5 If, as we assume, this collective consumption decision reflects the overall interests of the
Calivada collectivity, then it interacts with the producers' offers to
generate a result that is efficient for Calivada and the producers in the
same way that an individual consumer's decision interacts with pro-

14. It is a fair question to ask of me, "And where would the European Union be if the
Court of Justice had taken your view?" A fair question, but not a fair rhetorical question.
The answer is not obvious, especially since a great deal of what the Court did could have
been done under the rubric of anti-protectionism.
15. By this I mean a collective decision about what shall be consumed in Calivada, not a

collective decision made only on behalf of consumers, since the whole point was to reflect
nonconsumer interests as well.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1864 2000-2001

August 2001]

Trade Regulation

1865

ducers' offers to generate an efficient result
for consumer and produc16
ers in a failure-free unregulated market.
Second, it may be useful to point out that it makes no difference to
the argument about balancing where the plastic widget producers are
located. The primary economic point of our examples is that if the
legislature optimizes over the interests of consumers and environmentalists, then it will optimize over all interests, including those of producers. This economic point does not depend on the location of any of
the relevant interests (except insofar as it presupposes that the legislature has the necessary territorial jurisdiction over the consumers). It is
because the consumers and environmentalists are in-state that we can
go on to say that if the legislature optimizes over all in-state interests,
it will optimize over all interests, wherever located. 7 And this reference to location is of course crucial when we turn to the politicalprocess argument that we should presume the legislature optimizes over instate interests absent some specific suggestion to the contrary. But
still, the central point is the economic point that in order to make the
right adjustments to the market system, the legislature only needs to
consider the interests of environmentalists and consumers. Even if the
plastic widget producers were in-state, and therefore fully entitled in
the abstract to political consideration by the legislature, there would
still be no need for the legislature to think explicitly about their interests in this context.18 And if there would be no need for the legislature
to think explicitly about the interests of the plastics producers if they
were in-state, moving them out-of-state can hardly create such a
need.' 9
16. Talking about a collective consumption decision may raise worries about whether
this collective decision is an exercise of market power. The short answer is, not if the legislature is just protecting the environment. Even if Calivada is big enough to have market
power, and even if its decision has a significant impact on Nefornia producers, it does not
follow that Calivada is exercising market power in any standard sense. It is not doing anything which interferes with efficiency (as genuinely monopsonistic behavior would). It may
help to see this if we reflect that the result brought about by the Calivada green tax or taxmimicking ban is exactly the same result we would get without any regulatory intervention at
all (hence, no hint of a collective decision) if it was the consumers who cared about the environment instead of a separate group of environmentalists.
17. Once again, we assume that all external effects are in-state. Cf.supra note 12.
18. Remember the distinction I drew a few pages back between weighing their interests
and hearing their voice on relevant empirical questions. Also, if the legislature is considering
a ban, it needs to make some empirical prediction about possible price reductions in the face
of an efficient tax; but as we have seen, if consumer interests are properly accounted for,
they provide an adequate incentive for not biasing this prediction against the producers. And
the interestsof the producers need not be otherwise considered.
19. Notice I am not saying the location of the plastic widget producers is totally irrelevant. I am saying only that it is irrelevant to the question of whether there is any need for a
substantive weighing of their interests by a legislature motivated to promote efficiency. The
location of the plastic widget producers may be highly relevant to how the legislature is in
fact motivated. If the plastic widget producers are out-of-state, that creates an opportunity
for the local cardboard widget producers to secure protectionist legislation, exploiting con-
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B.
Let us now consider some further cases, including some to which
the argument of Section A clearly applies, some to which it clearly
does not, and some that may be uncertain.
1. A sort of case that is just like our original examples with respect
to the irrelevance of the virtual representation argument is the case
where the regulating government is trying to protect its consumers
against themselves. Sometimes consumers make decisions that are
against their own interests, and this is a species of market failure. It
may result from inadequate information, in which case labeling requirements may solve the problem if the society is literate and consumers are accustomed to paying attention to labels. Or it may result
from the fact that consumers are either unwilling or inadequately motivated to act on their own best interests.
It may seem that while inadequate information is a species of market failure, self-destructive choice by well-informed consumers is not.
But how we view such self-destructive choice depends on what we
view as the ultimate goal of the market-cum-regulatory system. If the
goal is to optimize over the revealed preferences of informed agents,
then obviously (informed) self-destructive choice is not a market failure. But if we view the goal as optimizing over agents' true interests,
then it is. In this view, the system counts on consumers to be effective
agents for their own interests, which for the most part they are. But
when they fail in their role as agents-for-themselves, that is a system
failure. Some people may think that government should never indulge
in paternalism vis-A-vis adults - it should never interfere with their
free and informed choices. But I do not think an absolute antipaternalism principle can be grounded in sound political philosophy,
and it is certainly not a principle of international law, trade law or otherwise. So, governments are entitled to paternalize their citizens as
consumers, and when they do so with good cause, they are correcting a
market failure.
Now, if a member-state government prevents a consumer from
buying something that she would otherwise buy from a foreign producer (or if the government merely discourages the purchase by a tax),
this will leave the foreign producer worse off than he would have been
otherwise. It should be clear, however, that judicial intervention to
give virtual representation to the producer's interest would be inappropriate, for exactly the same reason it is inappropriate in our original examples. As before, absent specific reason to suspect a failure of
the political process with respect to local interests (including, as besumers in a way that they would be unable to do if the plastic widget producers were in-state.
In sum, it may indeed matter that the plastic widget producers are out-of-state, but it matters
only by providing a possible occasion for protectionism review.
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fore, protectionism), we presume that the legislature does at least as
well a court would at optimizing over local interests - in this case,
looking out for consumers. And if it is best for the consumer that she
not purchase the product the producer is offering, or that she not purchase it at the producer's price as modified by an efficient paternalistic
tax, then efficiency requires that there be no exchange. There is no occasion for further consideration of the producer's interest. In this sort
of case, as in our original examples, the member-state government is
attempting to correct a market failure that imposes costs on its citizens, and the affected foreign interests are in a market relationship,
actual or potential, with local actors. The regulatory problem exhibits
local/global equivalence. Virtual representation of the foreign interests by the court is not required.
2. Now we turn to a quite different example. Suppose Calivada
dumps raw sewage into waters it shares with Nefornia, or just allows
local businesses to dump noxious effluents into those waters. That imposes costs on Nefornia. Does my argument entail that we should have
no judicial review in such a case? Plainly it does not. It is not true in
this situation that if the Calivada legislature optimizes over local interests it will optimize over all interests, local and foreign. The legislature
is not responding to a market failure (the costs of the failure fall outof-state), and the relationship between the local actors and the relevant foreign interests is not a market relationship. There is still a question, of course, whether we should empower courts to deal with this
sort of case, but my present argument says nothing against it; in principle some sort of intervention to protect foreign. interests would be
appropriate. However, cases like this would not normally be thought
of as involving "trade regulation" at all, so we are still left to wonder
whether there are any trade regulation cases where the virtual representation argument has force.
3. Probably many readers have already been thinking about a sort
of case that has been a staple of European Court of Justice jurisprudence under Article 30 - cases involving divergent or conflicting
product standards (about labeling, packaging, composition, additives,
and so on). The issue is to what extent each country should be required to recognize other countries' standards.
Actually, we have already considered some cases involving product
standards. In the third of our original examples, the Calivada ban on
plastic widgets was a product standard for widgets; ° similarly the paternalistic consumer-protection regulations considered in subsection 1
are likely to take the form of product standards. But in the widget case
as I imagined it, the difference between Calivada and Nefornia standards reflected a difference in underlying values. Calivada had envi-

20. The second example, involving a tax, is formally different, but not substantively.
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ronmentalists who disliked the damage caused by plastic widgets;
Nefornia did not. Similarly, the primary cases I had in mind in subsection 1 were cases where there is a difference in underlying values where different jurisdictions have different views about what consumers should be protected from or significantly different views about acceptable levels of risk.
Where differing regulatory standards reflect different values, there
is no serious case for requiring recognition. Uniformity of standards is
not a value in itself, as the widget example makes clear: to require
Calivada to recognize Nefornia's standards for widgets (which allow
plastic widgets) would reduce welfare. A standard argument for uniformity is that it allows the achievement of economies of scale, but
even those are sometimes false economies. We do not forbid the sale
of skis because that might lead to greater economies of scale in the
production of snowboards. The structure of the widget case is different
because we have to interfere with consumer choice (by Calivada consumers) to internalize an externality and promote overall welfare, but
the basic point is the same. It would be a mistake to prevent that internalization just because doing so might permit greater economies of
scale in the production of plastic widgets.
So, the interesting problem is what the court should do when countries have divergent product standards and refuse recognition despite
seeming agreement on underlying values (including the acceptable
level of risk). One possibility is to require recognition, or at least to
have a strong presumption in favor of requiring recognition, on the
ground of comity or some such. The foundational text may of course
create a duty of comity, but I doubt whether a court should create
such a duty on its own. I wonder if the argument from comity doesn't
really reflect rather different considerations. It will seem most plausible for courts to require comity on 'their own when the various countries in the system are generally similar in their values, economic development, and political systems. But this is also just the sort of case in
which we will be most inclined to think that a refusal of recognition is
motivated by protectionism or by some other more inchoate form of
political failure such as I shall discuss presently. The more alike two
countries are in their values and political systems, the more likely it is
that a standard adopted by one would be adequate for the other. In
sum, judicial protection of comity is most appealing precisely when
nonrecognition is most likely to result from a process failure and to result in inefficiency. So I shall treat the argument for judicially originated protection of comity as a process/efficiency argument in disguise.
Comity aside, when should the court require recognition? Notice
that this is still a context that manifests local/global equivalence: if the
regulating legislature optimizes over local interests, it will be optimizing over all interests, local and foreign. The legislature claims to be

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1868 2000-2001

August 2001]

Trade Regulation

1869

protecting local health, or safety, or freedom-from-deception against a
threat from foreign goods - and so they may be. But consumers have
an interest in access to those goods, if the protection is not actually
necessary. Hence, there is no need for judicial intervention specifically
to protect the foreign producers. If the refusal to recognize the foreign
standard is best for local interests, it will be efficient overall. The virtual representation argument, with its focus on protecting foreign interests, is irrelevant.
We could stop here, insofar as our goal is just to refute the virtual
representation argument. But that would leave us with a very incomplete treatment of an important class of cases, so let us press on. If we
ask whether the court should actually count on the legislature to optimize over local interests in this sort of case, we may not be quite so
confident as in other contexts we have discussed. By hypothesis, there
is no issue about what values to protect, and that eliminates the
strongest reason for regarding the legislature as the best protector of
local interests.2 What could explain the refusal of recognition in the
absence of value disagreement? On the one hand, the nonrecognizing
legislature might honestly believe, as an empirical matter, that the
standard it refuses to recognize is inadequate to protect the relevant
values.22 On the other hand, the legislature might be engaged in covert
protectionism. In some contexts, like our example of the Calivada
legislature adopting a new green tax when it learns that plastic widgets
damage the environment, these two possibilities seem to pretty much
cover the field. But one of the reasons cases on lower-profile product
standards are so intractable is that in many of them, there seems to be
a third possibility: that in one way or another, the legislature has
hardly attended to the problem at all. The regulation in question may
be an old one that was nonprotectionist and made sense when it was
adopted, but that makes no sense now. Even such a regulation may be
hard to get rid of if it suits some special interest. Or the legislature
may have codified local consumer preference as of some particular
time, or local producer methods, without much thought. 3
Let us consider first this last possibility, "legislative apathy." When
the legislature is not paying an issue much attention, even the slightest

21. Of course, the court should be circumspect in deciding that there is no value disagreement. Divergent standards are evidence, even if not conclusive evidence, of just such
disagreement.
22. For the reader who is troubled by the reference to the legislature's "beliefs," such
references can be cashed out in terms of legislative process in the same way I explain in Part
III for references to legislative purpose.
23. Sometimes, of course, the adoption of existing consumer preferences or habits
makes sense. There may be good reason for not trying to get consumers to change. The legislature is likely to be much better informed than the court about consumers' ability to understand labels, or to resist advertising, or the like. Where these are important considerations, the case for upholding the legislature is much strengthened.
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protectionist impulse in the political process may be the determining
cause of some regulatory act or (especially) omission. 4 So we might
often be justified in regarding even the "apathetic" decision or nondecision as deliberately protectionist. But instead of trying to find actual
protectionist motivation, it might better reflect the political realities in
this context to take a "hypothetical" approach. We might ask what
would happen if the legislature did seriously consider the issue anew.
And we might say that if the court is convinced that if the legislature
considered the issue anew, it could not adopt or continue the challenged product standard except on protectionist grounds, then the
court should treat the regulation as protectionist and strike it down
without reference to the actual history of its adoption or continuation.
This approach is designed primarily to deal with cases where circumstances have changed since the regulation was adopted, or significant new information about regulatory possibilities has come to light,
so that the refusal of recognition now seems to achieve no valid goal.
But notice that the hypothetical approach is still not equivalent to the
rational basis test or less-restrictive-alternative analysis, where the
court formulates its own view on the empirical question of whether the
regulation does any good and upholds or invalidates the regulation accordingly. The question under the hypothetical approach is not just
what the technical facts are, but what the possibilities are for reasonable disagreement. Only if there could be no plausible explanation
other than purposeful protectionism for the legislature's disagreeing
with the court should the court overturn the regulation. In standard
contexts, like the Calivada widget examples, it will often be easier to
find protectionism by direct consideration of the actual adoption of
the regulation than by this "no plausible explanation other than purposeful protectionism" test. But in cases where the legislative process,
or recent legislative process, hardly exists, which may include many
low-level product standards cases, the hypothetical "no plausible explanation other than purposeful protectionism" test is a significant alternative.
I pointed out that the hypothetical approach is not equivalent to
the rational basis test or less-restrictive-alternative analysis, where the
court formulates its own view about whether the regulation does any
good and upholds or invalidates the regulation accordingly. That
brings us back to the first of the three explanations of nonrecognition
that I mentioned above. What if the nonrecognizing legislature honestly believes, after deliberation, that the standard it refuses to recognize is inadequate to protect the relevant values, but the court disagrees? Where there is no issue about values, but merely a scientific

24. I explain in Section III.B why this would be enough to make the legislative decision
count as protectionist.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1870 2000-2001

August 20011

Trade Regulation

issue, it might be argued that the court can hear expert evidence and
decide as competently as the legislature.
Now, even if we think the court should engage in rational basis review or less-restrictive-alternative review, this is not "balancing" in the
sense of this Paper. It is not balancing of the sort the virtual representation argument is supposed to justify. If the court sticks to the narrow
question whether the regulation achieves some benefit, either in itself
or in comparison to some less restrictive alternative, it is never called
upon to weigh costs against benefits. If the court finds itself balancing
local benefits and foreign costs, it will have gone off the rails. 5
Granted that rational basis review and less-restrictive-alternative
analysis are not balancing, the question remains whether the court
should engage in them. My own view is that the court should not engage in rational basis review or less-restrictive-alternative analysis.
Commentators who recommend rational basis review or lessrestrictive-alternative analysis often talk as if the question of the efficacy of the means had never been asked before the court asks it. But
sometimes the legislature has asked it, and has selected the means it
did precisely because it regarded them as efficacious. If the legislature
has made such a decision, the question arises why the court should feel
entitled to substitute its judgment for the legislature's on the empirical
question of the efficacy of the means.26I can see no adequate ground
for the court to substitute its own view.
Notice I do not say the court should exclude evidence on whether a
law achieves any of the benefit claimed for it, or on whether it
achieves any more benefit than some less trade-restrictive alternative.
Such evidence may be relevant to the question whether there is covert,
purposeful protectionism. But the question about the legislature's
purpose is distinct in principle from the question whether the law
achieves any benefit, even if some evidence about effects is relevant to
both. Also, the court has no choice but to inquire into the legislature's
purpose. It cannot accept the legislature's supposed empirical determination without considering whether it is disguised protectionism;
but it also cannot simply rely on its own determination of the empiri-

25. There is more discussion of pure and impure versions of these tests in Appendix 2.
26. Remember that I speak in generalities. Of course it could be that in some system the
foundational texts require the court to decide the substantive issue for itself, and to substitute its judgment for the legislature's in case of disagreement. For example, the central question in the interpretation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) under the
VTO is whether or to what extent they require such substantive review, as opposed to requiring only review of aspects of the legislative process. Although a literal reading, especially
of the TBT, might seem to require substantive review, I think. it is fair to say neither text is
completely clear. I shall say no more about them in this Essay.
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cal issue without begging the question of whose judgment should control.27

It might be said that in cases of disagreement, the presumption
should be that the court is right, since the legislature may have slighted
foreign interests. But that ignores the central point we have established - that provided the legislature is not motivated by protectionism, it does not need to consider foreign interests in this sort of case.
In contrast, it seems to me there is a real danger that the courts, as
federal institutions, will be biased in favor of trade-for-trade's-sake
and will thus be too solicitous of foreign interests. Courts may be subject to biases just as much as legislatures, even if the court's biases are
not for or against any particular nationality.
It might also be suggested that the disagreement here is not just
between the court and the legislature whose refusal of recognition is
under review. There is also the legislature that adopted the standard
that is being denied recognition. There is a disagreement between two
legislatures on the empirical issue, and the court appeals to its own
view only to break the tie. This probably makes the case for judicial
requiring of recognition about as strong as it can be, at least when the
countries involved are very similar. To my mind, it still gives too little
weight to the primary responsibility of the local legislature for the protection of local interests.2"
4. The last class of cases I want to discuss are borderline both as to
whether they are "trade regulation" cases and with regard to the applicability of the virtual representation argument. We will take our examples from the real world. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana29
involved a challenge to Montana's thirty percent ad valorem severance
tax on coal, ninety percent of which was shipped out of state. Even
though the tax did not discriminate in any way between in-state and
out-of-state purchasers of coal, it was challenged under the dormant
commerce clause, essentially on the ground that Montana's high tax
was exploiting foreign purchasers to fill the state treasury. Parker'v.
Brown" involved a dormant commerce clause challenge to a
California state marketing scheme for raisins, designed to raise and
stabilize prices to raisin producers. Again, ninety percent or more of
the raisins eventually went out of state. Cities Service Gas Co. v.

27. Remember there is a fuller discussion of the meaning and ascertainment of legislative purpose in Part III.
28. Nonbinding international standards may also be relevant to the issue of the nonrecognizing legislature's actual purpose. But it seems obvious that if the legislature has not
agreed to be bound by the standards, it should not be bound indirectly by the court's treating
divergence from such standards as dispositive of the case, under either the less restrictive
alternative rubric or the protectionism inquiry.
29. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
30. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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Peerless Oil & Gas Co.3 involved a dormant commerce clause challenge to Oklahoma's minimum-price-at-the-wellhead for natural gas,
ninety percent of which was shipped out of state. The minimum price
was defended as a conservation measure. The original of this line is
32 involving
Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products,
Pennsylvania's minimum price for milk producers. As in all the rest of
these cases, the regulation made no distinction between milk purchased for in-state distribution and milk purchased for shipment outof-state, but in this case only ten percent of the milk was destined for
interstate commerce.
As I say, these are borderline "trade regulation" cases. The
Supreme Court upheld all of these regulations without much difficulty,
but it nonetheless treated them as genuine dormant commerce clause
cases. In contrast, it seems unlikely that any of these cases would give
rise to a colorable challenge under the basic trade regulation provisions of the Treaty of Rome or the GATT - not under the GATT because the provisions are internal measures that are nondiscriminatory
even in effect, and not under the Treaty of Rome because, in addition,
any effect on trade falls on exports.33
As to whether the virtual representation argument has any force as
applied to these cases, that also seems unclear. The severance tax in
Commonwealth Edison and the minimum-wellhead-price in Cities
Service can both be defended as attempts to prevent the inefficiently
rapid depletion of nonrenewable resources. If that is how we regard
them, then it seems that regulation that optimizes over local interests,
which includes the producers, will optimize over all interests. If, on the
other hand, these regulations really are an attempt to exercise market
power, then optimizing over local interests will not optimize over all
interests, and protection of foreign interests by some central institution would be appropriate in principle. Much the same can be said
about Parker v. Brown. The marketing scheme may be an attempt
simply to stabilize the market, in which case it seems plausible that
what is best for the local producers is best for foreign purchasers as
well. But not if the scheme is an attempt to exercise market power,
which California certainly has in raisins.34
My remarks about these cases are tentative, but I do not propose
to try to sort them through further. Suffice it to say that these are the
31. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
32. 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
33. The Court of Justice has limited Article 34 to discriminatory measures. Case 15/79,
Groenveld [1979] ECR 3409. Incidentally, specialized provisions or agreements relating to
agriculture might be relevant to Parker and Eisenberg, but those are by definition not the
basic general rules about trade.
34. I ignore Eisenberg, since Pennsylvania seems not to have significant market power in

milk.
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cases that prevent me from saying categorically that the virtual representation argument has no force in the trade regulation context.
Whether I am over-scrupulous, or how important the limitation on my
claim is, I leave to the reader to decide for himself.
One final word. In the cases I have been discussing that involve
regulation affecting exports, the law was nondiscriminatory even in effect. So it is worth noting specifically that if we are confronted with a
law that has a discriminatory effect - a law that discourages exports
more than local sale (whether of processed or unprocessed goods) my refutation of the virtual representation argument still applies. Provided the law regulates economic relations between locals and foreigners, addresses market failure, and is nonprotectionist, there is no
need for balancing to protect foreign buyers. The regulation will exhibit local/global equivalence. The local producers who have an interest in selling to foreign buyers now play the same role that was played
by the local consumers, with their interest in buying from foreign producers, in our Calivada cases. They stand in, in effect, for the burdened interests.
C.
The reader who is now persuaded that the virtual representation
argument is irrelevant to most or all trade regulation cases could skip
directly to Part III. For the reader who is not persuaded, I include this
35. Thinking about cases involving exports does draw our attention to a fiction embedded in both the virtual representation argument and my refutation. Consumers are natural
persons, and they are normally -represented in the legislature of the territory where they consume. Some producers are also natural persons, but many producers are corporations or
other business organizations. (For convenience, I shall speak simply of "corporations.")
Now, corporations are not formally represented in any legislature I am familiar with, not
even local corporations. And yet the virtual representation theorist does not argue that we
should have judicial balancing review of all laws that burden corporations. He still wants to
distinguish between local and foreign corporations. I agree that this makes sense (where the
virtual representation argument itself makes sense, as I concede it does in some kinds of
cases). Corporations can exert political influence even without formal representation, and
some will have more influence than others. With regard to local corporations, we tend to
worry more about their having excessive influence than about their interests being slighted.
But if the virtual representation theorist is going to distinguish between local corporations,
who do not need balancing protection, and foreign corporations, who do, the criterion for
distinguishing cannot be formal representation. Nor can we plausibly suggest that the court
should examine particular corporations' political influence in particular legislatures case by
case. Some proxy is needed. The obvious proxy is the territorial location of the activity that
represents the particular interest of the corporation on which we are focusing. That proxy
seems to be implicit in the virtual representation theorist's claim, for example, that we
should balance to protect "foreign" plastic widget producers but not "local." There is obviously much more to be said about this issue, but it is not my project to develop the best version of the virtual representation argument. I can say for now that whatever criterion the
virtual representation theorist uses to distinguish between local and foreign corporations, it
is accompanied by the assumption that local corporations' interests are effectively accounted
for by the political process, and I can therefore rely on the same criterion in my response to
the virtual representation argument.
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section of episodic remarks prompted by audience reactions to earlier
versions of the Essay. Perhaps something here will speak to the
reader's doubts.
1. Consider again our very first example, where there are no environmental harms from plastic widgets, and where the unregulated
market achieves an efficient division between cardboard-widget consumption and plastic-widget consumption in Calivada. I want to remind the reader, at greater length than before, how and why the market generates an efficient result. The market accounts for all interests
by combining decisions of separate decisionmakers, none of whom
considers any interests but his own. In our present example, the
cardboard-widget producers and the plastic-widget producers each
consider their own interests, and they embody those interests in decisions about what products to offer for sale and at what price. Consumers consider their own interests, and they embody those interests in
decisions about what they wish to buy and at what price. Each consumer will buy from the producer whose offer best comports with his
preferences. The final pattern of transactions is efficient because it is
determined by a process that evokes information about and compares
all affected interests, even though no single actor in the process considers all interests. This is the crucial point: In appropriatecontexts, it
is possible to have a process that optimizes over the interests of all parties affected, even though no single party or agency ever considers all
those interests.
Indeed, there may be a variety of processes with this property.
When the government intervenes in the market, as it does in our second and third examples, it need not actively consider all the interests
affected by its decision. The government can make adjustments to account for interests not otherwise properly accounted for (in our example, the interests of environmentalists, or in some other case, the interests of consumers who require paternalistic supervision). But once
those adjustments are made, considering only certain interests, the rest
of the work of accounting for other interests and producing an efficient outcome can still be left to a market-type mechanism.
I have heard the objection that my appeal to a hybrid government/market mechanism is incoherent. The market registers preferences, but when government intervenes (so goes the objection), it intervenes to protect interests. Hence the market and government do
essentially different things, and it is a category mistake to think government might ever properly rely on a market-type mechanism to
achieve governmental ends. Now, it is true that the market directly
registers only preferences, and that sometimes (in cases of paternalism) the very reason for government intervention is that people's
preferences and their interests diverge. Still, preferences are often a
good proxy for interests, both because people tend to prefer what is in
their interest, and because in many contexts their only relevant inter-
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est is in the satisfaction of their preferences. So, even if government's
proper and actual concern is with interests, it may be perfectly justified in leaving the protection of some interests to the market when
there is no reason to suspect that the relevant preferences and interests diverge. In our first Calivada example, when the government decides not to intervene in any way, it is relying on the market to optimize over everyone's interests, through the proxy of preferences. In
the second and third examples, when the government intervenes to
protect the interests of the environmentalists, we can assume that
there is no divergence between the environmentalists' preferences and
their interests; the problem is that the environmentalists' preferences
are not even being registered by the market, since the environmentalists are not parties to the transactions that affect them. And insofar as
the government leaves it to the market to protect consumers (second
example) or plastic-widget producers (second and third examples) it is
assuming that those parties' preferences adequately reflect their own
interests.
2. Let me now spell out the second example, involving the green
tax, to make it clearer why the legislature need not consider any interests but the environmentalists' when it sets the tax. Suppose that in
order to set the tax, the legislature investigates the physical consequences of the use of plastic widgets and decides how much those consequences damage the interests of the environmentalists. In the end
they decide, let us say, that each plastic widget in Calivada damages
the interests of the environmentalists (all of them together) in the
amount of T dollars. So they impose a tax of T dollars on each plastic
widget.
Consider what happens with the tax in place. A Calivada consumer
who buys a plastic widget at price P (tax not included) will have to pay
P+T. Therefore she will buy that widget only if its value to her is at
least P+T. But now, if the legislature has set the tax right, so that the
disvalue of that widget to the environmentalists is in fact T, the net
value of the widget to all Calivada citizens together is at least P+ T (the
value to the consumer) - T (the disvalue to the environmentalists) = P.
If the plastic-widget producers offer the widget for sale at P, then the
value to them of the widget (production costs, or opportunity costs, as
the case may be) is less than P. In other words, we will have a transaction if and only if the net value of the widget to all Calivada citizens
together is greater than the value of the widget to the producers.
Everyone's interests are taken into account, and the result is an efficient transaction or nontransaction. (In illustrating the virtues of the
market, we often point to the Pareto-improving properties of completed voluntary exchanges, so it is worth emphasizing that appropriate nontransactions are as important to the achievement of efficiency
as appropriate transactions.)

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1876 2000-2001

August 20011

Trade Regulation

1877

The above example is crude and oversimplified, but it should suffice to make the'point. All the legislature has to think about to secure
this efficient result is the interests of the environmentalists. It does not
have to think about the interests of the plastic-widget producers, nor
about the interests of the Calivada widget consumers. The interests of
the environmentalists were the only interests unaccounted for by the
unregulated market, and when the legislature intervenes to protect
those interests by adopting the tax, it does not somehow create a situation where it needs to investigate all the other relevant interests de
novo and compare them for itself.
3. I have pointed out that an efficient tax might eliminate all
transactions in plastic widgets, and that if the legislature believes this
will be the effect of an efficient tax, it might prefer a formal ban, which
is easier to enforce. It might be objected that legislation (tax or ban)
that eliminates all transactions deprives the producers of a fair chance
to compete. This is not so. The producers are not being denied a fair
chance to compete, even if their market share is reduced to zero. All a
"fair chance to compete" can plausibly mean is that one should not be
excluded from the market by measures that prevent efficient transactions. Fairness does not require that the plastic widget producers be
allowed to conspire with consumers to impose negative externalities
on the environmentalists. The producers are not entitled to a regime
that leaves them some business, nor even to a regime that leaves them
some business so long as they are prepared to make modest concessions from their pre-intervention prices. What they are entitled to is a
regime that leaves them some business if it is efficient that they have
some business, and they are getting that here.
Analogously to the "fair chance to compete" argument, the plastic
widget producers might say that if they have no chance at all to make
a transaction, as under the ban, then they have no chance to make an
offer that reflects their interests, so my underlying argument, which
depends on the producers' market participation to reveal their interests, collapses. There is a glimmer of sense in this, but no more. It is
true that before the legislature can impose the ban, as opposed to an
efficient tax, it must have some empirical expectation about the range
of foreseeable prices for plastic widgets. Of course, on many assumptions about the interests of the environmentalists and the consumers,
all we need to assume to justify the ban is that the price of plastic widgets will be positive - not an adventurous assumption. If the decision
is a closer call, then the legislature may look for guidance to historical
prices for plastic widgets in its own territory, or prices in other markets, or common sense. And, as I have pointed out, the legislature motivated solely by the pursuit of efficiency has an incentive, in the interests of its own consumers, not to impose a ban when the efficient tax
would leave plastic widgets with some market share.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1877 2000-2001

1878

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1853

If the plastic-widget producers still claim to be unfairly excluded by
an efficient ban, we might point out that the actual persons (natural or
legal) who produce plastic widgets are not excluded by the ban. In
principle, they could switch to producing cardboard widgets. This may
not be a realistic choice; but if it is not, the only reason it is not a realistic choice is that it is inconsistent with the producers' interests. If
what it would take to complete a transaction that reflects everyone
else's interests (consumers' and environmentalists') is inconsistent
with the plastic-widget producers' interests, then there should be no
transactions with them. In that conclusion, the producers' interests are
fully reflected.
I said earlier that fairness did not require that the plastic widget
producers be allowed to conspire with consumers to impose negative
externalities on the environmentalists. The producers might say that
fairness does require them to be allowed to impose that externality if
they have done so undisturbed in the past. They should not be disrupted by sudden changes. Now, this raises a different sort of issue.
This is not about a "fair chance to compete." This is a plea for relief
from transition costs, or for favorable redistributive measures. No
doubt in some cases the producers should have such relief, or such redistributive concessions. But I think we can say rather briefly in the
present context that neither transitional relief nor redistribution is so
generally appropriate that we should achieve it by a systemic rule limiting the sort of taxes or bans we are considering.36 Nor should we invite courts to evaluate the need for transitional relief or redistributive
measures on a case-by-case basis, except perhaps in such special circumstances as are contemplated by the GATT's Article XXIII:1(b) on
nonviolation impairments of interest.
4. I suspect that even now some readers will have the unshakable
feeling that courts should intervene to protect foreign producers when
they would not intervene to protect locals. After all, the foreigners are
unrepresented, they cannot protect themselves! There is of course one
hugely important judicial protection for foreign producers, and it is
protectionism review.37 In contrast, if a trade regulation is not protectionist, then we have seen that the foreigners' lack of representation
does them no harm. In the trade regulation context, the legislature
36. For related observations, see Howse & Regan, supra note 13, at 277-78, 282-83, 28788.
37. I have said that protectionism review can be justified as a way of preventing failures
of the political process in the treatment of local interests, and that is true. But it is also true
both that foreign producers are indirect beneficiaries of protectionism review so justified,
and that it is precisely their being foreign and unrepresented that invites exploitation of consumers by local producers. It is also the international dimension of protectionism that makes
it possible to discourage protectionism by international agreements, which seem to be more
effective against it than local politics. In this context, local consumers are largely indirect
beneficiaries of the political efforts of local producers-for-export.
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that optimizes over local interests will optimize over all interests, including those of foreign producers.
Of course, legislative mistakes are possible. Granting that the legislature will get it right for foreign interests if it gets it right for local
interests, still the legislature may get it wrong even for local interests,
and foreign interests may suffer in consequence. Might we not think
that a mistake against foreign interests is worse than a mistake against
local interests? And that we need judicial balancing review specifically
to prevent such mistakes against foreign interests?
Perhaps, but remember two points. First, we are talking about mistakes, not intentional local preference. It is not clear to me why genuine mistakes should be worse when they harm foreigners.38 Second, judicial balancing review is not the straightforward cure for legislative
mistakes that it may sound like. The reason we generally leave things
to legislatures is that they are more likely to correctly identify and
weigh the various competing interests than courts. And my central
point has been that this is true in the trade regulation context also, despite the involvement of foreign interests. Introducing judicial balancing review of nonprotectionist regulation will tend to reduce the
accuracy of the system.39 Therefore it only makes sense if reducing the
accuracy of the system seems a reasonable price to pay for biasing the
system against mistakes that harm foreigners. For myself, I do not
think we should bias the system this way, but I have no more to say for
now against someone who thinks we should - except to caution him
to be sure he is not still in the grip of the immensely seductive virtual
representation argument.
III. PROTECTIONISM, LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE,
AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

A.
There is controversy about how we should understand protectionism, but even so, it is clear that suppressing protectionism is the most
widely accepted goal for systemic limitations on member-state trade
regulation. Why is it universally agreed that protectionism should be
suppressed? The answer, clearly, is that protectionism is inefficient.
That is not the only reason one might have for suppressing protec38. For my response to one suggestion about why mistakes against foreigners might be
specially problematic, see the discussion in Section III.B of the "appearance of protectionism" test.
39. We might wonder whether we can bias the balancing inquiry itself in such a way that
it will (statistically) improve on legislative results. I suggest in Section III.C that the standard
attempts to bias the balancing inquiry in this way turn it into purpose review.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1879 2000-2001

1880

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1853

tionism, but it is by far the most salient argument in the general theoretical discussion of trade regulation (not specific to any one legal system) that this Essay addresses.'
If the primary reason to suppress protectionism is that it is economically inefficient, the question about the meaning of protectionism
becomes the question of what sort of regulation causes inefficiency:
regulations with protectionist purpose? regulations with discriminatory effect? regulations that use means that do not achieve their objectives, or that achieve no more of their objectives than some less traderestrictive alternative?
Let us start with the last of these candidates. There is no doubt that
a law that restricts trade and achieves no benefit is inefficient. So is a
law that restricts trade more than some alternative that would achieve
the same benefit.41 But even though laws that are more traderestrictive than necessary are inefficient, it does not follow that the
court should investigate and decide for itself whether a law is more
trade-restrictive than necessary and invalidate laws that it finds are so.
As I pointed out in Section II.B.3, that begs the question of whose
judgement should prevail when the court and the legislature disagree
about the necessity of the law. If the legislature genuinely believes that
the law is necessary - that no less restrictive alternative would
achieve the same benefit - I can see no justification for the court's
substituting its judgment (unless, as I suggested above, circumstances
have changed, or new technological information has come to light,
since the legislature acted). Rather, the court should rely on its own
judgment only when it is persuaded that the legislature has not genuinely made a conflicting judgment (or could not do so now in light of
the current situation), which is to say, only when the court is persuaded that the legislature was motivated by protectionist purpose (or
would be so motivated if it made the supposed judgment of necessity
now). So, let us set aside the question whether the legislature has cho-

40. Examples of other reasons for suppressing protectionism: (1) One might object to
protectionism on the ground that it involves discrimination against non-nationals or nonresidents. But it is clear that there is no general principle forbidding countries to favor their own
citizens or residents. So we need a special explanation of why such discrimination is objectionable in the context of market regulation, to which the obvious answer is the interference
with efficient allocation. (2) Another reason to oppose protectionism is that it may undermine attempts to increase political integration. That is relevant only in systems where political integration is a goal. (3) Anti-protectionism can also be part of the broader project that
Miguel Maduro usefully calls "market-building" in his very interesting study, WE THE
COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE & THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION

88-102 (1998).
41. The first situation is a special case of the second. If a law achieves no benefit, then
the "same benefit" could be achieved by the less restrictive alternative of having no law at
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sen apt means for its ends, which leads us back indirectly to an inquiry
into legislative purpose.42
If we assume the legislature is achieving what it intends, the question remains whether protectionism should be defined by reference to
protectionist purpose or by reference to "protectionist effect," by
which I mean disparate impact on foreign competitors of local economic actors. To pose the question thus clearly is virtually to answer
it, if we remember that the objection to protectionism is on efficiency
grounds. Protectionist purpose causes inefficiency; disparate impact on
foreign competitors does not. Consider our example of the Calivada
regulation taxing or banning plastic widgets. If the purpose of the
Calivada legislature is to internalize the environmental harm caused
by the use of plastic widgets in Calivada, then, as we saw in Part II, the
law is efficient. (Remember we are assuming the legislature's means
achieve the actual ends.) The law is efficient despite its disparate impact on foreign widget producers. The reason for the disparate impact
is just that foreign producers produce more harmful widgets; it would
be inefficient to buy from them. In contrast, if the purpose of the
Calivada legislature is not to protect the environment, but only to advantage local cardboard widget producers, then the law is not efficient.
It causes a misallocation of resources and reduces overall welfare. The
legislative purpose is the key.
Here is another way to make the point. Notice that in our two scenarios - where the Calivada legislature either does or does not have a
genuine environmental purpose - the economic circumstances of the
law, the text of the law, and the physical effects of the law - both on
the environment and on patterns of trade - may be identical.And yet
in one scenario the law is efficient, in the other it is not. The reason is
that efficiency is determined not just by physical effects, but by people's preferences about physical effects. Whether the law is efficient
depends on whether it reflects actual environmental preferences of
Calivada citizens, which we assume it does if the legislature's purpose
is to protect the environment, and which it does not if the legislature's
purpose is mere protectionism.43
42. Of course, evidence about the aptness of the means to the ends is highly relevant as I have said before and will say again - because it is relevant to the purpose inquiry. But
the question for the court is not the ultimate question about means and ends; it is what the
legislature thought.
43. Notice I have implicitly excluded constituents' preferences from the "economic circumstances" of the law. Of course in a sense they are the crucial circumstances for determining efficiency, as the text makes clear, but they are not normally among the circumstances that judges who are trying to avoid a purpose analysis talk about as relevant to
whether a regulation is protectionist. The 'WTO Appellate Body took a step in the right direction in European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, AB-2000-11, VT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2000), when it said consumer preferences
about health risk are relevant to a determination of what are "like" products under Article
111:4. 9122. (It also said the health risk was relevant to the "physical properties" criterion of
likeness, but perhaps only because of the effect on "competitive relationship", $114, which
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Anyone who has thought seriously about the meaning of "protectionism" (or of "discrimination" more generally) must have asked
himself at some point: "Why should the court worry about legislative
purpose? Surely it is the effects of laws that matter in the end." We
now have the answer to this question. In one sense, it is the effects that
matter, the consequences of the law in operation." But it does not
follow that the court should focus on effects. To decide whether a law
has good effects, we must decide both what its physical consequences
are and how those consequences matter - how they comport with
people's preferences, how they should be valued. The legislature is a
better body than the court to make both of these judgments, especially
the second, provided it actually makes the relevant judgment. So, when
the court considers legislative purpose, what it is really considering is
whether the legislature has made a decision (regarding what effects to
pursue and how) that the court can defer to. If the legislative purpose
is protectionist, then the legislature's decision is one the court should
not defer to; whereas if the purpose is genuinely to protect the environment (or health, safety, informed consumer decision, or so on),
then judicial deference to the legislature is in order.
B.
So far I have been making free use of the concept of legislative
purpose. Some people doubt that the concept is intelligible; they
doubt that we have any clear meaning in mind when we speak of the
purpose of a corporate body. The short response is that beliefs about
the purposes of groups and corporate bodies are deeply and indispensably entrenched in our ways of thinking about such entities.45 In supgets us back to consumer preferences.) But the majority of the Appellate Body said nothing
to suggest that the preferences of third parties, like the environmentalists, are relevant to
"likeness" or are part of the relevant circumstances. (The concurring member left more
room for this. 1154.) The majority's position confirms my claim about judicial behavior, although I think it is wrong-headed as an interpretation of "like." If plastic widgets harm the
environment in a way cardboard widgets do not, and if the legislature acts on environmentalists' concerns, then-plastic widgets and cardboard widgets should not be regarded as like
products even if widget consumers are environmental philistines who regard them as perfect
substitutes. (In the majority's defense, it did not need to consider third-party preferences in
order to reach the correct result, which it did.)
44. I ignore the point that a discriminatory purpose may have direct bad effects of its
own - as when a venture into protectionism poisons other diplomatic relations, or when
discrimination by a legislature between its own citizens on grounds of race, or sex, or religion
creates feelings of second-class citizenship.
45. A number of central doctrines of American constitutional law are explicitly formulated in terms of legislative purpose. E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (free exercise of religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (establishment of religion); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(sex discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (race discrimination). For
two centuries American Supreme Court justices have denied their concern with legislative
motive, when it suited their purposes to do so, at the same time that they have built up a
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port of this short response, remember that what we are concerned
with here is the general motivation behind a statute or regulation. If a
city council adopts an ordinance forbidding "vehicles in the park,"
there may indeed be no answer to the question whether they intended
to exclude battery-powered roller-blades. But that is not the sort of
question we are asking when we ask whether the legislature was motivated by protectionist purpose.
For those who are still skeptical, let me suggest a way to reanalyze
the concept of legislative purpose that should make it more palatable
and much harder to reject. First, imagine that in our Calivada widget
example, the plastic widget producers as well as the cardboard widget
producers are in Calivada. Even in these circumstances, with the plastic widget producers in-state, the Calivada legislature might adopt a
statute banning plastic widgets. The primary political support for such
a ban would almost certainly come from citizens' concern for the environment.46 This concern might be mediated through environmental
groups, but those groups would not be powerful without genuine citizen support. So there is some possible causal process in the legislature,
describe it how you will in the most positivistic political science terms,
that would count as the plastic widget ban's being occasioned by environmental concern. Now move the plastic widget producers out-ofstate. Surely it is still possible that if Calivada adopts a ban on plastic
widgets, the causative political forces are the same ones that operated
to produce the ban when the plastic widget producers were in-state. It
is also possible, of course, that a new causal process has taken over that the cardboard widget producers are using their position as the
only in-state producers to exploit local consumers by denying them access to foreign plastic widgets. But if there are two possibilities, it is
sensible to ask which of these possibilities is realized. Which set of
causal forces is responsible for the ban? That, I suggest, is the very
same question I have referred to as 'the question about "legislative
purpose"
- which indeed seems to me the most natural way to refer
47
to it.

This analysis of legislative purpose in terms of legislative process,
specifically in terms of the political forces that account for the adoption of the law, helps us to deal with a number of standard questions
constitutional jurisprudence in which questions about legislative motive play a central, explicit role. I suspect every individual justice who sat for any length of time could be quoted
on both sides of the issue. The proof of the pudding; however, is in the actual purpose-based
doctrines.
46. It is possible of course that the ban would be adopted just to advantage cardboard
widget producers vis-A-vis (in-state) plastic widget producers, but'that is relatively unlikely
- certainly not sufficiently likely that the court should worry about it, especially since any
distortion is likely to be corrected by the further political activities of similar parties.
47. And what if both environmental forces and protectionist fbrces are at work? I discuss that in the next paragraph but one.
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and objections concerning the purpose approach. One standard objection points to the possibility that individual legislators may have only
"oblique" intentions. In the Calivada case, for example, some individual legislator may not care either about the environment or about protecting cardboard widget producers. Of course, his having no purely
personal view is not a problem, if he votes in his representative capacity to advance the views of his constituents. But he may not be doing
even that; his constituents may be indifferent or inattentive. If so, the
legislator may care only about toeing his party's line, or doing a favor
for a friend in the legislature, or settling a score with an enemy. But in
every one of these cases, even if the individual legislator has no personal (or representative) view about the issue at all, he is casting his
vote on behalf of someone who does.' Since our basic question is not
about the personal views of the legislators but about what political
forces are at work in the legislature when it produces the regulation,
we can simply regard the legislator as a conduit. The important question is what forces are at work through him, whatever his personal reasons for putting his vote at their disposal.
Another standard problem that our process analysis helps to resolve is the problem of multiple motivation. Suppose the legislature is
moved by both environmental and protectionist purposes; that is to
say, suppose both environmental and protectionist forces are at work
in the legislature. When do we count the result as protectionist? The
answer is that the law should count as having been adopted with a protectionist purpose when the contribution of the protectionist forces
was a but-for cause of the decision. If the protectionist impulse was not
a but-for cause, then a majority of the legislature voted for the regulation on environmental grounds, and the court should defer to that
majority. If the protectionist impulse was a but-for cause, so that without it the regulation would not have been adopted, then there was no
majority of the legislature that voted for the regulation on environmental grounds, and there is no majority for the court to defer to.4 9
Notice I do not assume that individual legislators have unmixed purposes; some may have been moved only by environmental considerations, some only by protectionist considerations, and some by both.
But in theory we can ask about each legislator how she would have
voted if any protectionist impulse actually affecting her vote had been
absent. In practice we cannot undertake a legislator-by-legislator inquiry. But the question how the legislature as a whole would have
acted if there had been no protectionist forces at work is sufficiently
48. Or who does indirectly: if the legislator is doing a favor for a friend, and the friend is
trying to please his constituents, then our legislator is pleasing those constituents at one remove.
49. The but-for test is adopted, without this explanation, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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well-defined and, I think, sufficiently amenable to judicial decision for
our purposes. (I shall say more about the judicial tractability of the
process inquiry later on.)
Even some people who are sympathetic to the view that protectionism should be understood in terms of legislative purpose worry
about whether we should be concerned with "subjective" or "objective" intent. Our suggestion about analyzing purpose in terms of process casts some light on this matter. With regard to natural persons, the
basic distinction, I take it, is between what is in the mind of the actor
(subjective intent) and something else (objective intent) that is supposed to be inferable just from externally observable circumstances,
including both the context and consequences of the action. Now, with
regard to the legislature, we cannot refer to its collective "mind" as
comfortably as we refer to the mind of a natural person, but the obvious analogue to concern with the "subjective intent" of a natural person is concern with the internal workings of the legislature, concern
with what goes on in the legislative halls. If we are concerned with
"objective intent," in contrast, we treat the legislature as a black box
and try to infer the relevant intent just from the inputs (the external
circumstances) and the outputs (the text of the regulation and its observable consequences). If this is the distinction, then it is clear that
what we should be concerned with is "subjective" intent. We have
analyzed purpose in terms of the legislative process, specifically in
terms of the causal factors that operated in the legislature to produce
the legislation. But this process is internalto the legislature. It is a matter of what happens in the legislative halls in the generation of the law,
not Ia have
matter of the consequences.
not just chosen arbitrarily to define protectionism in terms
of "subjective" legislative intent. I have shown that we must define
protectionism this way if we are to preserve the relationship between
protectionism and efficiency. Whether a law is efficient depends, in
the sort of case we are concerned with, on the purpose with which it
was adopted." To put the point the other way around, no understanding of "objective intent" can possibly do the job. We have not
said just what "objective intent" is - its proponents never do - but it
is supposed to be inferable somehow just from the economic circumstances in which the law is adopted, the text of the law, and its physical
effects. But we have seen that these factors are not enough to determine whether the law is efficient. There may be two laws, one of which
is efficient and the other not, which are adopted in identical economic
circumstances, which are identical in their texts, and which have identical physical effects. Hence no possible understanding of "objective
50. In practice, of course, the court may rely partly on presumptions and per se rules,
but for now we are trying to identify the ultimate question for which the presumptions and
per se rules should be designed as heuristics.
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intent" can distinguish between efficient and inefficient laws. Despite
this general demonstration, I shall return in a moment to the question
whether there is any useful way to spell out the notion of objective intent. But first there is another issue that has probably become pressing
in many readers' minds.
In addition to the distinction between subjective and objective intent, let me distinguish between what I shall subjective and objective
evidence. By "subjective evidence," I mean express avowals or denials
of protectionist purpose by individual legislators or other relevant officials, or in corporate documents like committee reports. "Objective
evidence" is everything else that might be relevant to the determination of legislative intent, including evidence about economic circumstances, the text of the regulation, and evidence about effects. With
this distinction between kinds of evidence in hand, we can state two
common objections to the subjective intent test. On the one hand,
some people regard it as improper for the court to consider subjective
evidence at all, even though it would seem to be the most persuasive
evidence on the issue of subjective intent. The argument is that the
legislature is not responsible to the court for its internal processes, but
only for its results (or something like that). On the other hand, many
people worry that if the court is limited by the focus on subjective intent to considering only subjective evidence, it will be unable to ferret
out many instances of covert protectionism, and regulations that
should be invalidated will be upheld.
As to the first objection, concerning the impropriety of considering
subjective evidence, I shall merely observe that even courts that claim
to have scruples about considering subjective evidence seem to consider it whenever it is available.51 And rightly so. Purpose is the crucial
question, and the court should consider whatever evidence there is. As
to the second objection, that if the court is limited to considering subjective evidence it will be hamstrung in its attempts to ferret out covert
protectionism - that is true enough, but irrelevant. There is no reason
at all for the court concerned with subjective intent to limit itself to
considering subjective evidence as I have defined it. Lots of objective
evidence (evidence other than express avowals regarding purpose) is
relevant to the issue of subjective intent, including of course the text
and the effects of the regulation under review. As I just said in a different context, the court should consider all relevant evidence, of
whatever sort.
51. See, for example, Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.
333, 352 (1977), where Chief Justice Burger makes a point of quoting subjective evidence of
protectionist purpose from the record. even as he denies the necessity of finding protectionist
purpose, and Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,Report of the Appellate
Body, AB-1997-2, VT/DS31/AB/R, at Part II.B.3 (June 30, 1997). As I pointed out in note
45 supra, courts that claim not to be interested in legislative motive or in subjective evidence
cannot be taken at their word.
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So, courts should consider subjective evidence, but they are not
limited to it. The use of subjective evidence should create no problem
if we keep in mind a few obvious precepts:
(1) Courts can find protectionist subjective intent even when there
is no smoking gun in the form of subjective evidence of such intent, indeed even when there are explicit legislative denials of protectionist
purpose. In some cases, the ,objective evidence of language, circumstances, and effects is enough to establish subjective intent (still defined in terms of the internal legislative process) by itself.
(2) Pointing in the other direction, a court should not be overimpressed by subjective evidence of intent that may reflect the purposes of only one or two legislators without reflecting the purpose of
the legislature as a whole. The question is not whether there was a
."taint" of bad purpose in the legislative process. The question is about
what political forces actually determined the result.
(3) Finally, it is perfectly consistent with a subjective intent approach to have a "virtually per se" rule (as the United States Supreme
Court calls it)52 against explicit local/foreign discrimination - in other
words, to presume that explicit discrimination in favor of locals is protectionist unless some strong justification is positively demonstrated.53
Let me now return to the question whether we cannot make something out of the notion of "objective intent," despite my argument
above that a satisfactory interpretation is impossible. The impulse to
try to find a useful "objective intent" test is strong. The name itself is
seductive. If we believe in the rule of law, we would like legal tests to
be as objective as possible, rather than subjective. And it is easy to
suppose that the "objective intent" test must be more objective, in the
relevant sense, than the "subjective intent" test. But this is an illusion.
What makes a test objective in the rule-of-law sense is (crudely) that it
poses a clear question that has relatively clear answers in most cases,
which different judges and observers can be expected to agree on. In
fact, the "objective intent" test does not pose a clear question at all;
instead, it is a sort of Rorschach test. The judge looks at all the "objective" evidence - the text of the statute, external circumstances, effects
- and then simply announces whether there is protectionism or not.
Consider the inability of commentators on the American dormant
commerce clause who defend a non-purpose-based "discrimination"
test to tell us just what constitutes discrimination.54 Or consider the
52. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). With regard to the WTO and
the European Union, see supra note 4.
53. As Justice Souter explains in his dissent in C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 422 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting), it makes sense to presume that
explicit discrimination has a protectionist purpose for the simple reason that nonprotectionist purposes can normally be achieved without explicit discrimination.
54. E.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause 25 v. Restriction on State
Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of ConstitutionalStructure, 31 WAYNE L.
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difficulty GATT and WTO dispute-settlement organs have experienced in giving any definite substance to the closely related question
of when products are "like" under Article 111:4. We have seen why this
happens. The objective evidence is inadequate in principle to distinguish properly in all cases between regulations that should be upheld
and regulations that should be invalidated. No coherent objective intent test is possible.
And still we may ask, is there not some way to make the "objective
intent" test more specific? One natural suggestion would be to interpret "objective intent" as something like "the intent we would attribute to an ideal legislature that adopted this law in these circumstances
with these effects." Aside from the fact that we cannot afford to idealize the legislature to the point where protectionist intent becomes
impossible, this definition presupposes that there is a unique intention
we would attribute to a more-or-less-ideal legislature satisfying these
conditions. But in any serious case the problem arises precisely from
the fact that such a legislature might or might not value the nonprotectionist benefit enough to justify the regulation. In the Calivada case,
for example, the question cannot be whether an ideal legislature
would value the environment enough to ban plastic widgets; there is
no answer to that question. The question is whether the Calivada legislature actually did value the environment that much, or whether it
was just pretending. What was their subjective intent?55
Another possible reading of the "objective intent" test would turn
it into what I shall call the "appearance of protectionism" test:
roughly, a court should strike down a regulation if it reasonably appears to foreign interests to be motivated by protectionism at their expense. One reason the "appearance of protectionism" test did not suggest itself sooner is that it is obviously not the right test if what we are
trying to do by the inquiry into protectionism is to weed out inefficient
regulation. How the regulation appears to foreigners is irrelevant to its
efficiency. But even though inefficiency is the central theoretical objection to protectionism, there are other possible objections to protectionism that suggest other tests. For example, protectionism suggests a
sort of hostility to outsiders, and if the federal system in question is
concerned with cementing political bonds or encouraging cooperation
across a range of contexts, protectionism may be damaging to that enterprise. For that matter, once a rule against protectionism has been

REV. 885 (1985); Michael E. Smith, State DiscriminationsAgainst Interstate Commerce, 74
CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1986).
55. In any particular case, of course, the evidence about actual legislative process or
purpose may be so thin as to leave us with little more than a guess about what most legislatures would have been doing in such circumstances. But even that is different from the question of what an ideal legislature would have been doing, and it is simply our best approach to
the question of what the actual legislature was actually doing.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1888 2000-2001

August 20011

Trade Regulation

1889

adopted in any federal or quasi-federal system, then violations of that
rule may undermine the trust between member-states on which the
system must to some extent rely. In either of these cases, what may be
damaging is not just actual protectionism, but the appearance of protectionism. Hence the appeal of the "appearance of protectionism"
test.
If we now consider the choice between the subjective intent test
and the appearance-of-protectionism test, which test should judges
employ? Not surprisingly, I recommend the subjective intent test. My
reason is that providing a neutral perspective - neither that of the actor nor that of the affected nonactor - is what we have judges for. If
we had no neutral dispute-settlement organs, then how the regulation
appeared to affected foreigners would determine their diplomatic or
legislative reaction (whether, for example, they would retaliate, or
scuttle other cooperative projects). Even the appearance of protectionism would tend to undermine future cooperation. But if there are
courts in place, the situation is changed. Trust in the central institutions can to some extent replace trust in the other parties. Instead of
having the court take the perspective of the affected foreigners in order to prevent damage from the appearance of protectionism, we
should encourage the affected foreigners to take the perspective of the
court. Indeed, we should require them to do so. The central institutions should make their own interpretations of events, and both parties should be expected to accept those interpretations. That, as I say,
is what the courts are for. The upshot is that the courts should decide
for themselves what the regulating legislature's subjective intent was,
not how it appears to the other parties.56
C.
Our last topic comprises a bundle of questions: Can courts adequately ascertain legislative purpose? Will courts be reluctant to accuse the legislature of protectionist purpose? Does the inquiry into
protectionist purpose collapse into balancing?
56. I say judges should decide "what the intent was." There is a sense, of course, in
which all the judges can decide is how it appears to them. Consider: There is a clear difference in principle between the statements "Verdi composed Oberto" and "I believe Verdi
composed Oberto"; even I can see that logically either might be true while the other is false.
But in practice, I am never in a position to actually recognize a divergence of truth value between these statements. In the same way, judges cannot distinguish in application between
the "subjective intent" test and what we might call the "appearance of protectionism to
judges" test. But there is still a difference between the "subjective intent" test and the original "appearance of protectionism" test, which was not about the appearance to judges, but
about the appearance to foreigners disadvantaged by the regulation. Judges applying the
original "appearance of protectionism" test could recognize and give some weight to a difference between their own perspective on the law and the perspective of parties negatively
affected by the law. This is just what they will not do if they apply the "subjective intent" test
for themselves, as I have argued in the text they should.
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As to the first question, remember that even the "subjective intent" version of the protectionist purpose test does not require the
court to peer into the minds of individual legislators. The question is
what political forces determined the legislative result. There may be
"subjective evidence" of protectionist purpose, if there are any legislative materials. It is surprising how often sponsoring legislators or
committee reports will explicitly state a protectionist purpose. (Perhaps not so surprising when we remember that politicians want credit
for their efforts on behalf of constituents or contributors.) Even in the
absence of subjective evidence, .the objective evidence about the context and timing of the legislative action, the text of the regulation itself, and the effects, may suffice to establish that the point of the
regulation is protectionism. 7 And the court may be assisted by presumptions and per se rules, such as the presumption that explicitly discriminatory regulations are the result of bad purpose.
I do not claim that the decision about whether or not protectionism was the determining political impulse is always easy, or that the
answer is always clear. Indeed, I have conceded above that sometimes
the court may be reduced to deciding what would have moved a "typical" legislature to produce such a regulation in such circumstances. 8
No plausible test can make every case an easy case. I do claim that
judges are well-suited to the task of deciding whether protectionism
was the determining political impulse, and that as a class they are
likely to be more competent at making this decision than at making
the technical and evaluative decisions required by balancing or even
just the technical decisions required by rationality review or less restrictive alternative analysis. As a class, what the sort of people who sit
on high-level national or international tribunals know about (aside
from legal doctrine) is politics. Nobody gets to such a position without
being acutely sensitive to how political institutions work. The positive
reason why judges should ask whether there is protectionist purpose is
that, as we have seen, that is the right question in principle. But the
case is strengthened by the fact that judges can do at least as well by
this question as by any other that has been suggested. 9

57. Consideration of such evidence does not mean the inquiry into purpose has collapsed into balancing, as I shall explain further below.

58. See supra note 55.
59. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that although I recast the question of purpose in
terms of the political process, and although I have argued that judges are likely to be good
critics of the political process in the legislature, I am not suggesting that the court should engage in "free-form" process review, looking for distortions of the political process behind
just any law. Rather, judicial inquiry into the possibility of distortion should be triggered by
certain phenomena that make the presence of such distortion especially likely and especially
problematic - such as explicitly discriminatory legislation or significant disparate impact on
a disfavored group.
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A standard objection to the purpose test is that judges will be reluctant to accuse the legislature of protectionist purpose, and so too
few laws will be invalidated. This seems to me quite implausible.
Finding that a legislature was motivated by protectionism is not at all
like, say, finding that some local school board in the United States was
motivated by racism. In the latter case, there may be some substance
to the worry that courts will be too reluctant to accuse a very small
group of people of a heinous attitude. But the accusation of protectionism is hardly such a grievous charge, and a finding about the behavior of a large body normally says nothing about any individual. It
should also remembered that any judicial invalidation of a regulation,
on any ground, entails some criticism of the regulator. If the invalidation is based on a finding that the regulatory means do not achieve the
putative end, or that they achieve less of it than some less restrictive
alternative, then the regulator is criticized as irrational, or illinformed, or as motivated by. protectionist purpose (even if the court
does not say so). If the invalidation is based on balancing, supposedly
justified by the virtual representation argument, then the regulator is
implicitly criticized as insensitive to, if not callously disdainful of, foreign interests. I see no reason to think the court will be, or should be,
more reluctant to find protectionist purpose, which is a very natural
and understandable temptation for legislatures, than to accuse the
legislature of these other failings.
This brings us to our final point. We have seen that balancing is not
required in principle in trade regulation cases. The proponent of balancing might still claim, as a last gasp, that even if balancing is not required in principle, it provides the criterion of validity in practice. He
might say that the attempt to identify protectionism collapses into balancing in any hard case. This is a misunderstanding, occasioned by the
fact that the evidence relevant to protectionism overlaps with the evidence relevant to balancing. But the overlap is only partial, and the
questions on which the evidence bears remain distinct.
The principal evidence that is relevant to both inquiries is evidence
about local benefits from the law. The existence and magnitude of local benefits is obviously central to the balancing inquiry. It is also relevant to the protectionism inquiry. If a law that transfers business from
foreigner producers to local producers does not appear to achieve the
nonprotectionist local benefit claimed for it, that suggests that the law
is protectionism in disguise, because it suggests that the only local
group benefited by the law is the local producers. But even here, the
proper question under the protectionism approach is whether the enacting legislature thought there would be a (nonprotectionist) benefit.
If the legislature sincerely believed in the benefit, the court normally
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has no warrant to second-guess that empirical judgment.' Inevitably,
and properly, the court's view about the likelihood of the benefit will
affect its judgment about the legislature's actual beliefs and goals. Still,
the ultimate question for the court is not whether there are benefits,
but whether the legislature thought there were.
Local benefits aside, what about evidence regarding the foreign
costs of the law? Here there are two differences between the balancing
inquiry and the protectionism inquiry. First, all foreign costs are relevant to balancing, whereas it is clear that many foreign costs have no
relevance at all to the protectionism inquiry. If Michigan forbids the
sale of cigarettes, that has enormous costs in North. Carolina and
Virginia, costs that would figure prominently in a balancing inquiry.6'
But those costs do not even begin to suggest a protectionist motivation, since Michigan produces neither tobacco, nor cigarettes, nor any
close substitutes. The only foreign costs relevant to the protectionism
inquiry are costs resulting from the transfer of business from foreign
producers (in the standard case) to their local competitors. In the absence of such costs (that is, if there is no such transfer of business), we
are not going to believe the law was intended as protectionism.62
Even with regard to the costs associated with the transfer of business, there is a further difference between the protectionism inquiry
and balancing. In the balancing inquiry, it is not enough to know that
there are such costs, or even that they are significant. In principle, we
need to know just how big they are. Only then can they be balanced,
at least if the balance is at all close. In contrast, in the protectionism
inquiry, once we find that there are such costs, and that the correlative
benefits to local producers are significant enough so that they might
plausibly have mobilized local producers behind a protectionist
agenda, the inquiry shifts to whether the costs did in fact mobilize such
a protectionist agenda and whether that was what carried the legislature. Further precision about the actual magnitude of the transfer is of
little or no importance. There may be some positive correlation between the size of the transfer of business and the likelihood of protectionist motivation, but once we are over a threshold, the correlation is
a very loose one, and the ultimate question is about what moved the
60. Except where circumstances have changed significantly since the adoption of the
law. See the latter part of Section II.B.3.
61. Lest we forget: there is no justification for a balancing inquiry here, as my refutation
of the virtual representation argument has shown. If it is good for Michigan consumers to
ban cigarettes, there is no need to worry about the interests of the tobacco farmers and cigarette manufacturers, at least in the context of deciding whether or not Michigan can have its
law (that is to say, setting aside issues about transitional aid or welfare redistribution). But
my point for the moment is how the protectionism inquiry differs from a balancing inquiry,
however unjustified the latter would be.
62. It could have been a totally misguided attempt at protectionism, in which case it
hardly matters whether we strike it down or not, but such cases we can ignore.
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legislature, not the size of the transfer. Rather than more precision
about the size of the costs,, what we will want is evidence about
whether any nonprotectionist interests might have provided the political impetus for the law.
So, protectionism review does not collapse into balancing, even
though it looks at some of the same evidence. Actually, a better case
might be made that balancing collapses, or should collapse, into protectionism review.63 The classic statement of the balancing test for the
American dormant commerce clause, in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,'
does not say that the law under review should be struck down if the
foreign costs are greater than the -local benefits. It says that the law
should be struck down if the foreign costs are "clearly excessive" in
relation to the local benefits.65 This is similar to the question under
proportionality review whether the costs are "disproportionate." What
is the justification for these deviations from pure balancing? One
natural suggestion is that they amount to a sort of "manifest error"
rule. We recognize that legislatures are generally better suited to the
balancing inquiry than courts, but even legislatures make mistakes, so
we say that a court should overturn the legislative result when and
only when the court is strongly convinced that the legislature got it
wrong.
That still leaves the question of how strongly convinced the court
needs to be. My own suggestion is (crudely) that the court needs to be
sufficiently strongly convinced that the legislative result does not represent a correct balancing so that it thinks the reason for the legislature's error was protectionist purpose. My reason is this: given that the
legislature in general does better than the court at balancing, the court
should displace the legislative decision only if it has some explanation
of why the legislature was mistaken in the particular case. Just believing they were mistaken, just disagreeing with them, is not an explanation; believing they were motivated by protectionist purpose is. So, the
court should not displace the legislative decision unless they believe
there is protectionist purpose (or-unless there has been a significant
change of circumstances since the law was adopted, which would also
explain the legislature's "mistake," and the law fails the "hypothetical" purpose test outlined in Section II.B.3).

63. I have argued elsewhere that in the practice of the United States Supreme Court,
balancing "collapses" into the purpose inquiry in trade regulation cases - that the language
of balancing disguises a concern with purpose and nothing more. Regan, supra note 3;
Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1865 (1987). Sometime I will publish an update, arguing that the jurisprudence from 1987 to
2001 confirms - indeed strengthens - my claim.
64. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
65. Id. at 142.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1893 2000-2001

1894

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1853

There is another way balancing collapses into purpose review. In
many contexts, we concede too much to the balancing idea when we
speak of the issue as whether the legislature is "mistaken." Insofar as
the issue is an evaluative one, it is unclear what it could mean for the
legislature to be mistaken, except that they did not actually make the
evaluation claimed because they were motivated by a covert protectionist purpose. The court cannot decide whether some foreign cost is
"excessive" or "disproportionate, in comparison to a local benefit
without knowing how much that local benefit is worth. But there is no
canonical answer to that question. Different regulatory jurisdictions
are entitled to have differing views about the worth of such a benefit
and to embody their differing views in their own legislation, and it is
efficient that they do so, provided the legislature reflects the preferences of all its constituents. It follows that a court cannot displace the
legislature's decision without saying (at least implicitly) either, "This
legislature's claim to find a sufficiently large local benefit is insincere,"
which means there is a disguised impermissible purpose, or else, "It is
not plausible that any legislature could sincerely find a sufficiently
large local benefit." The second formulation may sound like a less direct criticism of the particular legislature, but actually it entails the
more direct complaint. In sum, the court cannot carry through on the
balancing inquiry without explicitly or implicitly reviewing the legislature's purpose.

APPENDIX 1: UNCONSCIOUS PROTECTIONISM?

Since I endorse the subjective intent test, I ought to say something
about the problem of "unconscious motivation," which has occasioned
considerable discussion recently in connection with the American constitutional law of race discrimination.' Unconscious motivation is not
an issue that is often raised in connection with the protectionism inquiry, perhaps because subjective intent is not well established as the
correct basic test. As we shall see, there are reasons why the issue of
unconscious motivation can be ignored in the trade regulation context;
but it is certainly worth explaining why. Consider an example from the
sphere of race discrimination, a schematized version of Memphis v.
Greene.67 The City of Memphis, Tennessee, erected traffic barriers on
a major street to reroute commuter traffic around a residential neigh66. E.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
67. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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borhood. On the face of things, there is no problem here; this is the
sort of thing cities do all the time. But in this case the residential
neighborhood was predominantly white, and the commuters who were
forced to detour around the neighborhood were predominantly black.
The city's action was challenged under the Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution on the ground that this race-correlated exclusion was
a "badge or incident of slavery." The Supreme Court upheld the road
closure, on the ground that the city officials who made the decision
had no intention of disadvantaging blacks because of their race; they
simply were not thinking about race at all. One common criticism of
the Court's reasoning is that they should have considered the possibility that the decision was the result of unconscious racism.
Suppose we ask ourselves whether the Memphis officials would
have closed the road if the commuters had been white and the neighborhood black, with everything else the same. It is easy to suppose
that in these circumstances the officials would have kept the road
open, still without thinking consciously about race. There is much evidence that in current American society, minorities' interests are undervalued by decisionmakers, even when those decisionmakers do not
consciously think in terms of race (or sex, or whatever) at all.' Now, if
the road would not have been closed for the benefit of a black neighborhood in the same way it was for a white neighborhood, it is clear
that race is determining the city's decision even if no official is thinking consciously about race. We may say that the outcome is the result
of "unconscious racism," which I now define in terms of this "partyreversal" test. Unconscious racism, so defined, is surely troublesome
even if it is not clear what doctrinal role such a potent concept should
have.69
Notice a point that will be crucial when we return to the issue of
unconscious protectionist motivation in the trade regulation context:
Even in Memphis v. Greene, the fact that the original road closure was
motivated by unconscious racism in the sense we have described does
not entail that it was a bad law from the point of view of cost-benefit
analysis or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. It could perfectly well be that the
benefit to the white homeowners of the closure was greater than the
cost to the black commuters (considered just as commuters, any feelings of racial victimization aside). Of course, that means that in the
race-reversed case, the right result would also be to close the road,
now for the benefit of the black homeowners. By hypothesis, that
would not happen. But the reason it would not happen would not be
68. E.g., Jersey Chen et al., Racial Differences in the Use of Cardiac CatheterizationAfter Acute MyocardialInfarction,344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1443 (2001).
69. It should be noted that the Court in Memphis v. Greene specifically said that "there
is no reason to believe that [the city] would refuse to confer a comparable benefit on black
property owners." 451 U.S. at 119.
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that the closure was undesirable; the reason would be that the white
commuters could use their excessive political weight to block a desirable law. So, unconscious racist motivation does not entail inefficiency.7 °
The same is true in the protectionism context. Someone might easily believe that even though the Calivada legislature was not consciously trying to protect local cardboard widget producers when it
banned plastic widgets, still it would not have banned the plastic widgets if the plastic widget producers had been in-state. But even if this
were true, it would not follow that the ban was inefficient. The alternative is that the ban is efficient, and would be efficient even if the
plastic widget producers were in-state, but that if the plastic widget
producers were in-state, they would have used their political muscle to
block the enactment of this efficient law because of its costs to them.
So, if we allow the concept of "unconscious protectionism," we must
recognize that a law might be unconsciously protectionist and still be
perfectly efficient.
This conclusion casts no doubt on my earlier argument about the
connection between conscious protectionism and inefficiency. There is
a real distinction here between conscious and unconscious protectionism. If the protectionism is conscious - that is, if protectionist political forces were positively active and responsible for the law - then we
have seen that the law is inefficient because it interferes with trade
without achieving any other benefit (as seen by the legislature). Conscious protectionism is itself a distortion of the political process. In
contrast, unconscious protectionism need not reflect any actual distortion of the political process. It may only reflect the fact that foreign
producers who are properly disadvantaged in the actual situation by
an efficient regulation, could themselves have distorted the process
and blocked the regulation if they had been in-state.
So, what should we do with a finding, in some particular case, of
unconscious racism or unconscious protectionism? I think the answer
may be different in the two contexts. In the race context, it seems
quite plausible to say that we care more about preventing any sort of
racism, even unconscious racism, than we care about efficiency, and
therefore we should strike down laws that are unconsciously racist
even if they are efficient. ("Plausible," I say. I'm not sure I believe it.)
The same claim does not seem so plausible in the protectionism context. Indeed, I think we can ignore the issue of unconscious protectionism entirely. Why the difference?
70. Another way to see that unconscious racist motivation does not entail inefficiency
(racial feelings aside) is this: given our definition of unconscious racism, if the road closure
for the benefit of white homeowners is unconsciously racist, so also is the hypothesized nonclosure for the benefit of white commuters. But on our assumption that everything else is
held constant as the race of the parties is changed, those decisions cannot both be inefficient.

So one of them must be efficient despite being unconsciously racist.
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One reason we care more about unconscious racism than about efficiency is that even unconscious racism reveals that the officials are
not representing all their constituents even-handedly. If the officials'
conscious motivation is nonracist, they may be trying to be evenhanded. But if they are unconsciously racist, they are not succeeding in
being even-handed; race is still determining the outcome. In the trade
regulation context, however, we do not require even-handed representation; the foreign interests have no right at all to representation. They
do have a right to not be excluded from the market by inefficient
regulation, but that obviously gives them no right to the invalidation
of an efficient regulation even if it is, in our sense, unconsciously protectionist. In the race context, if we strike down an efficient but unconsciously racist regulation, we are saying in effect that black citizens
ought to be guaranteed the same opportunity as white citizens to block
efficient governmental decisions. The courts ought to duplicate for
blacks even the distortions of the political process that whites would be
able to accomplish in the blacks' situation. It makes no sense, to my
mind, to say that foreigners are entitled to have the courts duplicate
for them the distortions that they would be able to accomplish if they
were in-state.
There is another difference between the race context and the trade
regulation context. In the race context it is easy to see how unconscious racism might result in an inefficient law even in the absence of
conscious racism. The Memphis city officials who closed the road
might have done so inefficiently because they responded only to the
(perfectly genuine) interests of the white homeowners and did not respond appropriately to the even stronger interests of the black commuters. Even without consciously depreciating the interests of the
black commuters, the officials may simply have failed to appreciate
them properly because of their (unconsciously) disfavored status. In
the trade regulation context, however, there is no room for an analogous failure. So long as we retain the standard assumption that the
well-motivated legislature does right by local interests, there can be no
inefficiency without conscious protectionism. 7 In our standard example, if Calivada's adoption of the plastic widget ban is not motivated
by subjective protectionist intent, that means that the political force
behind the law was the environmental interest; the legislature decided
71. Of course, we do not assume in the race context that the legislature does right by all
local interests; we make that assumption only in the absence of some specific reasori for
doubting it, such as the social and political significance of race. In the race case, what corresponds pragmatically to the assumption (in the trade context) that the legislature does right

by all local interests is the assumption that the legislature does right by all white (or majority) interests. Now the difference between the contexts, as I explain in the next paragraph of
the text, is that in the trade context getting it right for the favored (i.e. local) interests entails
getting it right for disfavored (foreign) interests as well, whereas in the road-closure case,
getting it right for the favored (white) interests does not entail getting it right for the disfavored blacks as well.
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that the environmental interest was stronger than the consumer interest in plastic widgets. Furthermore, as I have argued, the ban is efficient. If the legislature has done right by local interests, then the result
is efficient for all interests, local and foreign. It could still be that the
law is "unconsciously protectionist" in our sense; it could still be that if
the plastics producers were in-state, the ban would not have been
adopted. But it remains true that in the trade regulation context, the
absence of subjective protectionism entails efficiency. Which is to say,
there can be no inefficiency resulting from unconscious protectionism
in the'absence of conscious protectionism.
At the risk of belaboring the not-so-obvious, let me make sure it is
clear why there is this difference between the race context and the
trade context. In the race context, there is (normally) no favored
(white) interest that vicariously stands in for the disfavored (black) interests in the way that local consumers stand in for foreign producers
they would like to deal with in the trade context. In our example, there
are no white homeowners whose interests are economically linked
with those of the black commuters. As we have said, the city officials
may just have failed to appreciate the black commuters' interests,
without conscious prejudice. But the black commuters' interests could
not have been similarly ignored, except as a result of conscious prejudice, if they were vicariously represented by some favored white interest, as the interests of foreign producers are vicariously represented by
local consumers.
We can now summarize why we need not worry about unconscious
protectionist motivation in the trade regulation context, using both of
the differences we have identified between the trade context and the
race context. In the trade context, if there is no conscious protectionist
motivation, the law is efficient (second difference); and if the law is efficient, we do not care that it may be unconsciously protectionist (first
difference). So, unless there is conscious protectionism, there is no
failure we care about.72

72. I am not aware of any trade case that discusses unconscious protectionism, but the
Panel in In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirementfor Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Final Report of the Panel (Oct. 16, 1989), decided under the Free Trade Agreement
between Canada and the United States, does discuss the sort of hypothetical party-reversal
that we have used to define unconscious favoritism. The Panel uses the party-reversal idea as
the tertium quid in a logical maneuver that appears to convert what begins as a purpose inquiry (1 7.04) into what is ultimately stated as a balancing inquiry ( 7.10, 7.14), by way of
the party-reversal idea (1 7.09). But a plausible reading of the Panel report is that the "balancing" inquiry is really just a heuristic for the party-reversal inquiry, and the party-reversal
inquiry in turn is just a heuristic for a (logically distinct) inquiry into whether Canada would
have adopted the 100% landing requirement independently of its protectionist effect. This
last is the very question of actual protectionist motivation. I do not assert that this heuristic
cascade is what was going on, but the entire present Essay is an argument about why it
should have been. (I am prepared to believe the Panel got the right result, but I do wonder:
If the landing requirement was Kaldor-Hicks inefficient (and non-party-reversible, and protectionist), why were the Canadian fishermen or exporter-middlemen who wanted to sell to
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2: A CLOSER LOOK AT RATIONALITY REVIEW, LESS

RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS, AND
BALANCING/PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

The question posed by rationality review is whether the regulation
achieves its asserted (or imputed) nonprotectionist goal to any degree.
The idea is that a law that does not achieve its goal to any degree is
completely irrational and may be invalidated on that ground. But I
would suggest that, except where circumstances have changed or new
information has become available since the time of enactment, laws
are hardly ever irrational in the sense that they have no tendency at all
to advance their actual goals. If a law has no tendency to advance an
asserted nonprotectionist goal, the preferred inference is normally not
that the law is irrational, but that it is protectionist. I have suggested
previously that if the legislature and the court genuinely disagree on
the empirical question of means-end efficacy, the court should defer
(except in cases of changed circumstances).73 In sum, rationality review
only makes sense as purpose review in disguise.
Whatever its defects, rationality review (as officially stated) is the
least objectionable of the non-purpose-based tests we are considering.
If the court invalidates a law on the basis of a finding that there are no
good effects at all, then although it is relying on its own empirical
judgment (and preferring its own empirical judgment to the legislature's if it is not persuaded of the legislature's bad purpose), it is not
required to make any normative judgment; it is not required to weigh
a bundle of benefits against a bundle of costs, since there are no benefits to weigh.
Turning now to less restrictive alternative analysis, the basic idea is
clear enough: Even if a law has nonprotectionist benefits, if the same
benefits could be achieved by another law that is less trade-restrictive
(the "less restrictive alternative"), that other law. should be preferred,
and the original law will be invalidated. At this point we need to distinguish two versions of less restrictive alternative ("LRA") analysis.
One version, which I shall refer to as "strict LRA analysis," operates
as just described: a law will be invalidated only if there is an alternative that achieves all the same benefits at lower cost. But true LRAs,
which achieve all the same benefits (or even virtually all the same
benefits) at lower cost, are relatively rare. Much more common are alternatives that achieve most of the benefits at lower cost. LRA analyUnited States processors, and who were hurt along with the United States processors, unable
to block it?)
73. See the latter part of Section II.B.3.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1899 2000-2001

1900

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1853

sis is often applied to invalidate laws when there are alternatives that
achieve most of the benefits at lower cost and where the benefits sacrificed by the change to the alternative are judged by the court to be of
less value than the cost-avoidance achieved by the change. This I shall
refer to as "loose LRA analysis." (Notice that "strict LRA analysis" is
not stricter in the sense of invalidating more laws; it invalidates fewer.
It is "stricter" in the sense of interpreting more strictly the basic notion of an eligible "alternative.")
Now, strict LRA analysis is really just rationality review applied,
not to the rationality of the choice "this law or nothing," but rather to
the choice "this law or that one," where "that one" may be any less
trade-restrictive alternative.74 Accordingly, everything I have said
about rationality review is applicable here also. The evidence that
tends to show the existence of a (strict) LRA also tends to show protectionist purpose: why would the legislature choose a more traderestrictive way of achieving precisely the same benefits unless it in fact
attached positive value to the trade-restriction? Strict LRA analysis
makes best sense if viewed as a heuristic for purpose analysis. Still,
even as officially stated, strict LRA analysis is relatively unobjectionable in the same way rationality review is. Even if it (problematically)
involves preferring the court's judgment to the legislature's on an empirical question (the question whether the "alternative" is really fully
adequate), strict LRA analysis does not require the court to make
comparisons of value.
"Loose" LRA analysis is much more problematic because, by definition, it does require the court to make comparisons of value. This
distinguishes it sharply from purpose analysis. In fact, loose LRA
analysis is a form of balancing or of proportionality review stricto
sensu - balancing if the question is whether the costs of preferring the
actual law to the alternative are greater than the benefits, proportionality review stricto sensu if the question is whether the costs are disproportionate to the benefits. We shall return to the idea that loose
LRA analysis is a version of balancing/proportionality review presently.
Moving on to true balancing/proportionality review, we must again
distinguish between two variants. If we look at a law and ask whether
the costs of the law outweigh the benefits (balancing) or whether the
costs are disproportionate to the benefits (proportionality review), we
are implicitly taking as the alternative to the law "no legislative action." That is the benchmark from which costs and benefits are measured. Balancing/proportionality review of this form I shall call "total
effects" review. But of course, we could also consider any alternative
74. One "less trade-restrictive alternative" is of course the "no legislative action" alternative specified by rationality review itself, so strict LRA analysis includes rationality review
as a special case.
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law with lesser costs, and inquire whether the extra costs of the actual
law as compared to that alternative outweigh (or are disproportionate
to) the extra benefits of the actual law as compared to that alternative.
This I shall refer to as "marginal effects" review, where different
"margins" for evaluation are defined by different alternatives. Marginal effects review includes total effects review as a special case,
where the relevant alternative is "no legislative action."
Now, marginal effects balancing/proportionality review is equivalent to loose LRA analysis (which may be of either balancing form or
proportionality form). Loose LRA analysis, as opposed to strict LRA
analysis, is "balancing/proportionalityat any margin" as opposed to
"rationality review at any margin"; and marginal effects balancing/proportionality review, as opposed to total effects review, is "balancing/proportionality at any margin" as opposed to "balancing/proportionality where the alternative is no legislative action." The
oppositions are different, but loose LRA analysis and marginal effects
balancing/proportionality review are the same.
All of this leads me to a suggestion about how the various tests
should be understood. (Mind you, I do not endorse all the tests I discuss. I am just making a suggestion about terminology that I think
would clarify thinking about which tests to endorse.) We should mean
by "LRA analysis" what I have called "strict LRA analysis," and we
should mean by "balancing/proportionality review" what I have referred to as "marginal effects balancing/proportionality review." The
reason is that if we adopt these specifications, then we have a nested
sequence of tests. In the sequence <rationality review, strict LRA
analysis, marginal effects balancing/proportionality review>, each test
invalidates everything invalidated by its predecessor, and something
more. In contrast, if we use "LRA analysis" to mean "loose LRA
analysis", then the nesting fails, however we interpret the balancing/proportionality test at the third stage. Remember that loose LRA
analysis is equivalent to marginal effects balancing/proportionality review. So, if "LRA analysis" refers to "loose LRA analysis," then total
effects balancing (one candidate interpretation for the third-stage) is
actually a less restrictive test, while marginal effects balancing (the
other third-stage candidate) is no more restrictive. So, on either interpretation of "balancing/proportionality review" at the third stage, we
lose the nesting. The reason is that the useful notion of strict LRA
analysis has been left out entirely.75

75. For completeness, notice that at each of the second and third stages, we have two
possible interpretations of the test (loose or strict LRA analysis and marginal effects or total
effects balancing/proportionality review). So there are four possible sequences (at the last
two stages) in all. Three are discussed in the text: <loose LRA, marginal effects>, rejected
because these are equivalent; <loose LRA, total effects>, rejected because the latter is less
restrictive than the former; and <strict LRA, marginal effects>, which is what I recommend.
The remaining possibility is <strict LRA, total benefits>. As the reader can easily verify,
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Of course, all this logical analysis matters only if it is an open question which tests to adopt and why. If the relevant court is committed in
any event to marginal effects balancing/proportionality review (or the
equivalent loose LRA analysis), then all the other tests are included
and need no separate statement, except for whatever heuristic value
they may have in particular cases in focusing the inquiry on particular
modes of invalidity subsumed under the master test.

these two tests are not comparable in terms of our ordering; each invalidates some laws not
invalidated by the other. And this sequence never includes in any form what balancers
should regard as the best all-round test, loose LRA = marginal effects review.
For completeness in a different direction, notice that an alternative nested sequence, but
one not suggested at all by the standard terminology, would be <rationality review, total effects balancing, loose LRA analysis>. In effect, this sequence moves from the same starting
point to the same end point as the nested sequence in the text (<rationality review, strict
LRA analysis, marginal effects balancing>), but by a different route. The sequence in the
text goes from "rationality as compared to no legislative action" via "rationality as compared
to any alternative" to "acceptable balance/proportionality as compared to any alternative,"
whereas the new sequence goes from "rationality as compared to no legislative action" via
"acceptable balance/proportionality as compared to no legislative action" to "acceptable
balance/proportionality as compared to any alternative." The two dimensions of the test are
changed in different orders.
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